Evidences4

Lecture VII – The Theory of Visions Considered and Refuted

“Brethren, be not children in understanding; howbeit in malice be ye children, but in understanding be men.” – 1 Cor. 14:20.

I have proved in the last two Lectures that within a very short interval after the crucifixion of Our Lord the Church was in possession of an account of His life and actions analogous in all its chief outlines to that which is contained in our present Gospels, and that this must have been the same as that which was handed down by His primitive followers. This being so, the theories which affirm that a large portion of their contents consists of myths and legends, which gradually sprung up in the Church during the first century of our era, are deprived of all possible locus standi. I have further proved, by the aid of the Pauline Epistles, that within a very brief interval after the Crucifixion the Church was reconstructed on the basis of the Resurrection. This being indubitable, it is incumbent on those who deny its objective reality to offer a theory which will afford a rational account of the origin of the belief in the Resurrection, and of the reconstruction of the Church on its basis. For this purpose the theory of visions has been propounded. It will now be my duty to inquire into its validity.

In order to impart the semblance of plausibility to this theory, it is necessary to assume that the original followers of Jesus consisted of a body of men who were in the highest degree enthusiastic, credulous, and superstitious, whose enthusiasm created a number of visionary appearances of Jesus risen from the dead, and whose credulity mistook them for external realities.* But as it is impossible to credit St. Paul with excessive credulity or superstition, the only way of discrediting his testimony is to affirm that be had been wrought up to so high a degree of enthusiastic exaltation, that he was unable to distinguish between his own subjective imagination and the realities of the external world. This charge against the Apostle I have disposed of in my last Lecture, by the evidence afforded by the three chapters connected with the text, which it seems to me to be impossible to examine carefully and not to arrive at the conclusion that it is invalidated by the facts.

*The mode in which this charge is attempted to be established is a noteworthy specimen of the reasoning which has been adopted in this controversy. Every instance of superstition which can be found in any Jewish writer for several centuries preceding the advent, or in any writer, whether Jewish or Christian, for several centuries after, has been carefully collected together; and the whole charged on the followers of Jesus. This is as unreasonable as it would be to credit Lord Bacon with all the superstitions which were held by Englishmen during the three centuries before his birth, or with believing in the Spiritualism of the present day. If we wish to ascertain how far a particular author is superstitious, it is absurd to credit him at once with all the superstitious which may have been prevalent for centuries before, and after his birth. The only correct course is to examine his own writings for the purpose of ascertaining the actual superstitions they contain. Thus in the case of the Gospels, the only accurate measure of the degree in which their writers were superstitious is the superstitions which are patent in their pages. It follows, therefore, that to charge the disciples of Jesus with a degree of credulity or superstition beyond that which is clearly displayed in the pages of the New Testament, is to draw a conclusion which the premisses will not warrant. If, on the other hand their excessive credulity is assumed, because they believed in miracles, this is not to reason, but simply to assume the point at issue. It maybe objected that they believed in demoniacal possession. Let the objection be accepted for as much as it is worth. But this is certainly no distinctive mark of credulity or superstition, for numbers of men of highly cultivated minds and of sound judgments have entertained the same belief.

In a similar manner the affirmation which has been so freely made, that the primitive followers of Jesus and the Christians of the first century were credulous and superstitious beyond the average of mankind is an assumption, of which the historical evidence is wanting. I say beyond the average of mankind; for unless it is taken for granted that they were so, the theory of visions cannot be made to bear even the semblance of plausibility. If the Resurrection was unreal, the credulity of the followers of Jesus must have been extreme; for it is evident that no ordinary amount of it would afford any adequate account of the origin of the belief. But if the question is asked, How do we know that His followers were credulous to the extent demanded by the exigencies of the positions taken by unbelievers? the only possible answer, in the absence of all adequate historical evidence of the fact, is that they believed in the reality of miracles and in the truth of the Resurrection. This, however, involves a plain begging of the entire question. The requisite degree of enthusiasm, credulity, and superstition, must be proved and not merely assumed.

The following facts must be accounted for before we can accept the theory of visions as affording an adequate ground for the belief in the Resurrection.

1. The possibility of reconstructing the Church on the basis of this belief within a very brief interval after the Crucifixion.

2. That not only individual disciples, but disciples when assembled in bodies, were firmly persuaded that they saw Jesus alive after His crucifixion, and had interviews with Him.

3. That these interviews were not casual apparitions, but they were fully convinced that they had conversations with Him, in which they received His definite instructions as to the mode in which the Church was to be reconstructed, and that in consequence they did actually reconstruct the Church on the basis of His spiritual Messiahship.

4. The rapid diffusion of the belief among those who were not original followers of Jesus, as is proved by the growth of the Christian Church during the thirty years which followed the Crucifixion.

5. The great change wrought in St. Paul from the most violent persecutor into the most devoted missionary of the Christian faith, as is proved by his own testimony.

6. The mighty power which has been exerted by Jesus Christ during eighteen centuries after the termination of His earthly life, as has been shown in the second Lecture of this course.

Of these unquestionable facts of history the Church has always given the following solution, which no unbeliever can deny that a sound philosophy must pronounce to be fully adequate: Jesus Christ rose from the dead: He had several interviews with His followers, in which He directed them to reconstruct the Church on the basis of His spiritual Messiahship: He endowed them with supernatural powers according to a promise made to them in these interviews, which enabled them to accomplish the work in question: They obeyed His commands. The result has been the creation of the Catholic Church, and the mighty influence which it has exerted on the destinies of man during the last eighteen centuries.

Let us now hear the solution which the theory of visions propounds as a philosophical explanation of these astounding facts. Jesus Christ never rose from the dead; but while His body was turning to corruption in the grave, some one or more of His enthusiastic followers fancied that they saw Him alive, and mistook the creations of their distempered imaginations for an actual resurrection. They forthwith, without further inquiry, accepted it as a fact, and succeeded in persuading the other disciples that He was risen from the dead. These in turn took to seeing visions of the risen Jesus, which they mistook for objective realities. In the height of their fanaticism, they not only fancied that they had interviews with Him, but that they received His orders to reconstruct the Church on the basis of His resurrection. As, however, He intended to withdraw Himself from public view, the happy thought occurred to some of them that they heard Him direct them to change the basis of His Messiahship from that of a present and visible into an absent and spiritual one. The attempt was made; the Church was reconstituted; the new faith spread; and the result has been the erection of the greatest of institutions, and all the mighty effects which it has exerted in the history of man, on the foundation of the baseless delusions of a few credulous fanatics.

Such is the theory. Its entire plausibility is derived from the general form in which it has been propounded. The moment we confront it with the facts of history and the realities of human life, it crumbles to pieces. Thus as a matter of mere speculation in the study, nothing is easier than to assert that some enthusiastic disciple of Jesus fancied that he saw Him alive after His crucifixion, mistook an apparition for a resurrection, and communicated his enthusiasm to the rest. But these last words hide whole mountains of difficulty. How was it possible under the circumstances of intense discouragement in which the disciples were placed by the blasting of all their Messianic expectations, through the crucifixion of their Master, to breathe into them the enthusiasm requisite for seeing visions of the risen Jesus; and on the strength of such a delusion to found an institution which has stood the test of eighteen centuries? How, I ask, are a body of men to be made to believe that a person who was only a short time previously publicly executed has risen from the dead, while his body must be still somewhere at hand in the grave in which it has been interred? Has anything analogous to this occurred in the history of fact, or in the dreams of fiction? Such a theory hopelessly breaks down when it is tested by the stern realities of life and the historical conditions of the case. Let us proceed to subject it to this test.

I. The starting point of all reasonings on this subject must be the night of the Crucifixion; for the affirmation that the belief was a gradual growth, which sprang up at a distance from the scene of the Passion is effectually disposed of by the testimony of the Pauline epistles. In what state of mind then must that evening and the following days have found the disciples of Jesus? A high state of mental exaltation is indispensable for seeing visions, and mistaking them for realities. Such visions are inconsistent with a state of mental depression which might have induced some disciple to fancy that he saw an apparition of the spirit of the murdered Jesus, but could not have suggested to the most credulous fanatic the idea of a resurrection.*

*The whole range of Grecian and Roman mythology may be quoted as a case in point. Rich as it is in ideal creations, in stories which involved the current beliefs in the supernatural, and in accounts of the apparitions of the spirits of the departed, it impresses us with the fact that the idea was all but universal, that from death there was no return. An inexorable fate demanded the death of man; the powers of the world below firmly grasped their prey: Jupiter himself was unable to avert from his children this inevitable doom. The two or three stories of heathen mythology which bear a resemblance to resurrections, are not only extremely grotesque, but are relegated to the distant ages of the past. The whole aspect of heathen literature proves, that although belief in the appearance of the spirits of the departed was strictly in accordance with the popular ideas of the possible; yet the return to life of one who had really died was believed to be impossible. I make this observation, because it has been often asserted in connection with this discussion, that in certain ages of the past the popular mind has not recognized the existence of such a thing as order in nature. Their order may not have been our order, but whenever the human mind advances beyond the lowest stages of barbarism, it is impossible but that it should recognize an order of some kind as existing in nature; but of this order even in the most mythical periods, the belief in the possibility of a genuine resurrection has never formed a portion.

What then were the facts? It is certain that His followers had been induced to believe in Him as the Messiah of popular expectation; and that the public execution of one who laid claim to this character must have been destructive of the idea of His Messiahship. Their history, it is true, had familiarized them with the idea of murdered prophets; but although this had frequently happened, their death had never once been vindicated by a resurrection; and the Messiah was not to be a murdered prophet, but a King who was to reign in the Kingdom of God. Whatever respect therefore they may have entertained for the character of their Master; and although it is within the limits of possibility that they should have believed that He was a prophet,* His crucifixion must have convinced them that He had been labouring under a delusion in claiming to be the Christ. Their mental condition therefore must have been that of men whose hopes and expectations were utterly blasted, the very opposite of that which would have suggested the idea of a resurrection, and induced them to see visions of their Master risen from the dead. The necessary conditions of doing so, I will consider presently.

*I make this admission on the strength of the words of Cleopas recorded in Luke 24:19. “Concerning Jesus of Nazareth, who was a prophet mighty in deed and word before God and all the people.” These words were spoken on the evening of the Resurrection. It is impossible that even His most devoted followers could have long continued to believe in the prophetical character of one who had been self-deceived in believing Himself to be the Messiah.

It may perhaps be urged, for the purpose of obviating this difficulty, that Jesus may have foreseen that the exasperation of His enemies would probably result in His death, and that for the purpose of encouraging His disciples, He told them that if this should happen, He would be raised again from the dead; by which He only meant that His cause would be resuscitated; and that they mistook this for a prediction of an actual resurrection; and that this raised so strong an expectation of it, as to cause them to see visions of Him returned to life again, which they mistook for realities. To this I reply that our only information that Our Lord predicted His death and resurrection is derived from the pages of the Evangelists. But if their testimony is valid to prove that He did so, it must be equally valid to prove that the disciples did not attach to His words the meaning which they literally have, and that they certainly did not suggest to them the idea of an actual death, or an actual resurrection.* It would therefore have been impossible for this to have produced the state of expectancy requisite for seeing visions and mistaking them for realities.** Still less could such an effect have been produced by the utterances of a few vague expressions, such as that God would vindicate His cause after His death; and that He would live again in its renewed life. The supposition that an utterance of this kind could have produced in the minds of the disciples such a state of expectancy as would have been requisite to enable them to see visions of Him risen from the dead, to hold imaginary conversations with Him, which they mistook for realities, and in consequence of his supposed instructions, to proceed to the work of reconstructing the Church, is too incredible to require serious argument.

*This habit on the part of opponents of accepting the testimony of the Gospels when it favours their own theories, and of rejecting it when adverse, is one which cannot be too strongly deprecated; for however it may help to confirm preconceived notions, it can lead to no result favourable to truth. Apart from their testimony that Jesus predicted His death and resurrection, the idea that He foresaw the high probability of His death, and expressed the hope that His cause would revive afterwards, and designated this revival a resurrection, and on the strength of this to propound such a theory as a true account of the most important event in the history of the world, is to build on a foundation of sand. When criticism accepts possibilities for probabilities, and probabilities for certainties, all it does is to construct history out of its own subjective consciousness, a practice which can only result in substituting our own notions for the realities of things.

**It may be urged that the institution of the Holy Communion was a distinct intimation made by Our Lord to His followers of His impending death. No doubt it was so; but it is very remarkable that in the account given by the Evangelists, there is no hint of His impending resurrection. If we take the accounts as they stand, not one word spoken by Our Lord on this occasion could have produced an expectation of it. The institution itself is one of the most remarkable facts in the world’s history, and is without precedent in the history of martyrdoms. A man in anticipation of being put to death on the morrow, directs his followers to perform a very peculiar rite for all future time in remembrance of his death. He tells them that they are to take a piece of bread, to break and eat it, and to drink of a cup of wine, in remembrance that his body had been broken for them, and his blood shed for the remission of sins. What is the only possible inference? Either that the person who instituted the rite was fully conscious that he was about to perform an act preeminently divine in thus surrendering his life; and that that act had an intimate connection with the remission of sin; or that he was labouring under such a degree of hallucination as to amount to disorder of the intellect. There is no alternative between these. The world’s history contains instances enough of martyrdoms; but the enthusiasm of no martyr has ever impelled him to do an act at all resembling this. Yet nothing can be more calm, impressive, and devoid of the smallest trait of enthusiasm than the account of the institution as it is given by the Evangelists. The whole scene is one of the profoundest solemnity. Yet the act in question has received a perpetual series of commemorations from the night of the Paschal Supper to the present hour; certainly without the intermission of a single week, probably not of a single day, during a period of eighteen hundred and forty-seven years. This renders the fact of the Institution one of the most indubitable in history; and constitutes an incontestable proof that Jesus claimed to be something very different from an ordinary man, however wise or good. Still, as I have observed, there was nothing in the institution itself to suggest to His desponding followers the idea that after a few days they would see Him risen again from the dead.

The theory of visions is compelled to assume two things, both of which under the historical conditions of the case involve such difficulties as amount to impossibilities.

First. That the followers of Jesus, both individually and conjointly, took to seeing visions of their Master risen from the dead.

Secondly. Not only must they have mistaken these visions for realities, but they must have believed that they had conversations with Him in which they received His definite instructions as to the new basis on which they were to reconstruct the Church. It is simply incredible that they would have ventured on making such a change if they believed that Jesus had risen from the dead, unless they were persuaded that they had received His definite instructions to do so.

This necessity of accounting not only for the belief in the Resurrection, but for the reconstruction of the Church on the new Messianic basis, involves those who propound this theory in a difficulty so overwhelming as to be subversive of the preconditions on which it necessarily rests. According to well-established principles of mental physiology, three mental states are necessary to enable even the most enthusiastic and credulous persons to mistake subjective impressions for external realities. These are Prepossession, Fixed Idea, and Expectancy; and unless they had been most energetically present in the minds of his followers, no amount of enthusiasm or credulity would have sufficed to create the necessary visions. But supposing that under the influence of these principles they had visions of a risen Jesus, it would have been impossible that visions generated by either prepossession or fixed idea could have suggested the reconstruction of the Church on a new basis.

Yet the fact that the Church was so reconstructed is unquestionable. It follows therefore that the minds of the disciples must have undergone a change as to the nature of the Messianic character during the interval which elapsed between the crucifixion of Jesus and the proclamation of His resurrection. How then will the principles of prepossession, fixed idea, or expectancy, account for their seeing such visions as could have led to the reconstruction of the Church? As for expectancy, I have already shown that it was nonexistent. Prepossession and fixed idea are principles of the most conservative description. Under their influence it is impossible for a set of new ideas to be generated in the mind. It follows therefore, if these principles had induced the followers of Jesus to mistake visionary appearances and conversations for realties, they could neither have suggested the requisite change in the Messianic conception nor the consequent reconstruction of the Church. On the contrary, they would certainly have gone on on the old lines.

II. But for the purpose of bringing these theories to the test of the facts of history, let us suppose all these difficulties to be nonexistent, and that such a state of enthusiastic exaltation existed among His disciples on the days immediately following the Crucifixion, that some one of them fancied that he saw Him alive, and spread among the others the report that He was risen. Let us further assume that this enthusiast was Mary Magdalene;* and that she mistook the gardener for Jesus. Is it credible, I ask, that a woman so enthusiastically attached to him, went away to report His resurrection to the disciples, without asking Him a single question? If she had done so, her delusions must have been instantly dissipated. But let us assume that what she fancied she saw was not the gardener, but a visionary creation of her own disordered imagination. Did she make no attempt to speak to her beloved Master? Some questions under the circumstances must have been inevitable. If she put them, did she get visionary answers, and fancy herself charged with some message to the disciples? Surely, if she did, it must have contained some promise to meet them. If so, was the promise kept? Or did He promise to meet her again? If he did so, and the appointment was not kept, her delusions must have ended. If however she fancied that she had subsequent interviews with him, she must have had a whole series of visions and ideal conversations, and mistaken them for realities. Such things may be conceivable in theory, but they become absolutely incredible when tested by the realities of this world of fact.

*I make this assumption because it is the most plausible form in which the theory of visions can be presented, it being far easier to conceive the possibility of a single person mistaking apparitions of the risen Jesus for realities, than that many did so separately and conjointly. As however it contradicts the most unquestionable facts of history, as proved by the testimony of the Pauline epistles, I do so under protest.

Let us however assume that she at once started off to tell the disciples that she had seen her crucified Master risen from the dead. Are we really to be invited to believe that in their state of despondency, occasioned by the blasting of all their expectations, they received such an announcement with open-mouthed credulity? Nothing is easier than to affirm with M. Renan that she communicated her enthusiasm to the rest. But how was it possible to do so? Does all history contain anything analogous to it? While there is no great difficulty in persuading ignorant people that a spirit has appeared, it is a wholly different thing to persuade even the profoundest credulity and the most greedy appetite for the marvellous, that a person once dead has risen again in bodily reality. As I have said, the history of fictions, while it abounds with accounts of departed spirits, regards stories of resurrections as lying outside the regions of the possible. This difficulty however is greatly increased when the person said to have been raised had been only a few days before publicly executed, and his body was close at hand corrupting in the grave. It is beyond the power of belief, that such a piece of information was accepted even by the most credulous of men, on the bare word of the informant. But let us further assume that she brought them a promise of an interview, which specified both the time and place. Was the promise kept? If not, there must have been an end of the delusion. But if they supposed that it was kept, then the whole body of the disciples must have taken to seeing visions together. Is this conceivable, while the body was close at hand, either in the custody of his friends or his foes?

It may perhaps be urged that they were satisfied with the allegation that it was necessary that he should retire out of the reach of his enemies. To this I answer, that such an excuse would have involved an open renunciation of his Messiahship, and rendered the reconstruction of the Church impossible. No amount of credulity could have accepted as a Christ one who declined to have an interview with his friends because it was necessary for him to withdraw out of the reach of his enemies, and that too after he had proved the reality of his Messiahship by his resurrection from the dead.

III. This brings us to the very centre of the difficulty, viz., the necessity of grappling with the unquestionable facts instead of bare assumptions. Common sense affirms, and the Pauline epistles prove beyond all doubt, that these apparitions, if such they were, must have been seen not merely by a single follower of Jesus, but by many of them, separately and conjointly; and not only so, but during these apparitions they must have had conversations with him, in which they received their Master’s directions as to the reconstruction of the Church on its new basis. I invite especial attention to this latter point as involving the theory of visions in the necessity of assuming the existence of these imaginary interviews and conversations, for in no other way can it account for the undeniable fact that the disciples did actually proceed forthwith to reconstruct the Church on this new basis, since it is incredible that they should have done so unless they had been fully persuaded that they had received their Master’s definite instructions as to the course they were to adopt.*

*I am aware that those who have propounded this theory maintain that the Church was reconstructed with the smallest possible deviation from the old Messianic basis; and that the persuasion of the early followers of Jesus was that He had only withdrawn from earth for a short time; and would soon return to assume the old Messianic character, and to take vengeance on His foes. But whatever might have been their belief respecting His speedy return, it is an obvious fact that the Church was reconstructed on the basis of an absent Messiah; and that this differed very materially from the old one. As I have said, if Jesus was still to continue to be the Messiah of the Church after His crucifixion, the idea of a visible Messiah was no longer tenable, unless He had exhibited Himself openly to public view after His resurrection; and consequently the Messianic conception had to be changed from that of a visible Christ who was to overcome all opposition, and to enter into His glory, to that of a Christ who had asserted his Messianic claims before the Jewish people, had been rejected, and crucified by them, and who, although He had risen from the dead, had taken no steps to crush His enemies, but had retired out of danger into heaven, from whence He had promised at some future time to return and take possession of His kingdom, but who in the meantime delegated to His followers the work of making converts, and the danger of asserting His Messiahship on this new basis. This is evidently the smallest possible change which the Crucifixion must have rendered necessary in the Messianic conception, if the claims of Jesus to be the Christ were still to be asserted. This change, however, is a very great one, and amply sufficient for the purposes of my argument. It is one which it is impossible to believe that His followers would have ventured on unless fully convinced that they had received His definite instructions during their interviews with Him after He had risen from the dead. Men had now to be urged to accept as Christ one who had been rejected and crucified by the heads of the Jewish nation, who had withdrawn Himself out of the reach of their animosity, and who had put off to some future day the work of vindicating His Messianic claims and taking vengeance on His foes. It is impossible to deny that this was a very onerous undertaking, and that it involved a fundamental change in the conception of His Messianic character. Nothing is more natural than the question which the author of the Acts puts into the mouth of the Apostles, as addressed to the risen Jesus, “Lord, wilt thou at this tine restore the kingdom to Israel?” The whole thing is utterly inconsistent with expectancy, fixed idea, or prepossession.

Unless therefore those who propound the theory of visions as a rational account of the origin of the belief in the Resurrection can solve these and other difficulties which are forced on them by the unquestionable facts of history, it must perish under the weight of its inherent absurdity. We know on the authority of the Epistle to the Corinthians, that the Apostles believed that they had at least two interviews with Him, when assembled together, that two of their number had private interviews with Him; that it was the universal persuasion of the primitive believers that He appeared to more than five hundred in a body, more than half of whom were surviving when Paul wrote the letter; and that Paul was firmly persuaded that he himself had seen Him. [See Supplement I.] There is no reason to believe that the Pauline list of appearances is meant to be exhaustive of all he had been informed of; but for obvious reasons, I do not refer to any mentioned in the Gospels.* This list, however, is quite sufficient for our purpose, as it proves that the Apostles were firmly persuaded that they saw Him alive when assembled in a body, that two of them believed that they had private interviews with Him; and that a very large number of persons believed that they had seen Him when they were assembled together. These facts St. Paul had such ample means of verifying, that unless they are true, he stands convicted of deliberate falsehood.

*Their historical character, as well as that of the earlier chapters of the Acts of the Apostles, being denied by unbelievers, forbids me to quote them here as authorities in discussing the question of the truth of the Resurrection.

This being so, it is hardly possible to conceive of such a state of mental hallucination, as this theory of visions is compelled to presuppose, as an adequate explanation of the historic facts. It is nothing short of this, that a body of persons when assembled together, believed that on two separate occasions they saw a person alive in the midst of them, within a few days after he had been publicly executed; and that, too, while the body must have been close at hand, mouldering in the tomb, unless it had been removed by the hands of his friends, in which case they must have known of its removal; or of his enemies; in which case it must have been a matter of public notoriety.

Such a species of hallucination exceeds the capacity of lunatics; for although individual lunatics often mistake visions for realities; yet concurrence among a body of them in believing that they see the same object is unknown.*

*It is doubtless a well established scientific fact that certain abnormal conditions of the mind can produce in individuals a conviction that they see certain objective realities, while what they fancy that they discern, is nothing but the subjective creation of their own disordered imaginations. I am aware of the existence of a few cases of spiritualistic manifestations which are alleged to have produced in a number of persons when assembled together, the impression that they all saw the same imaginary object, but there are no cases on record in which a number of persons have believed that they received collectively from a visionary object an extensive body of instructions for the regulation of their future conduct, and have proceeded to act on their reality. At any rate it is quite certain that not one of the abnormal mental conditions which are referred to by Dr. Carpenter in his work on “Mental Physiology,” would suffice to produce in a number of persons the belief, that on more than one occasion when they were assembled together, they saw a person who had been recently executed, alive in the midst of them; that they conversed with him, and heard him give definite instructions in reference to their future conduct, altogether different from their former views and ideas, and that on the strength of their persuasion that all this was an objective reality, they founded an institution which has had an historic existence for eighteen hundred years. Such hallucinations lie beyond the regions of the possible; and even if they could be conceived to be possible, that the attempt to erect a mighty institution on their basis should have proved a great success, is inconceivable.

But let us even assume that such impossibilities are possible. Here again we encounter all the difficulties to which I have already alluded, and with aggravated force. Is it credible, I ask, that a number of friends would have asked him no questions? If so, did they get answers? Such answers must have been all as visionary as the apparition itself the result of a common delusion. But under the peculiar circumstances of the case, we may be sure what some of these questions must have been. They must have related to points stirring in their minds of the profoundest interest. What about the future? Was He going to withdraw himself from the public view? Where, and when should they see Him again? Would He confront His enemies? What about His Messianic claims? What course were His followers to adopt? These, or similar questions, must have been inevitable. Did they believe that they got answers to them? If they did, all the answers must also have been visionary, the result of a common delusion; but if they got none, the illusion must have been dissipated.

But let us assume that they did receive visionary answers, which contained promises of future interviews. If these promises were believed to have been fulfilled, then there must have been a whole series of visionary interviews and conversations. If they were not fulfilled, the bubble of delusion must have burst. To ask us to accept such theories as affording a rational account of verifiable facts, and these the most important events in history, is to make a demand on our faith compared with which the belief in the most stupendous miracle recorded in the Gospels is a trifle.

In considering this subject it is hardly possible to overestimate the importance of the existence of the Church as a visible institution, which has lived an historic life from a brief interval after the Crucifixion to the present hour. Those who propound this theory forget that this is the most important thing to be accounted for; and treat the whole subject as if they were merely investigating the origin of a ghost story. That this great Society came into existence at a particular date, and at a particular place, is an historic fact. No less certain is it, that the Messianic conception on which it was reconstructed was wholly different in character from that which formed the original bond of union among the earliest followers of Jesus. Such a change must therefore have taken place in their ideas, as was adequate to convert the old bond of union into that on which the Church was actually reconstructed. The Crucifixion rendered the old Messianic conceptions utterly untenable, and unless new ones had been speedily adopted the little Society must inevitably have perished in its founder’s grave. But it is the most certain of facts, that the present historic Church came into existence within a few weeks after this event. Consequently, during the interval which elapsed between the Crucifixion and the first attempt to reconstruct it, the disciples must have abandoned the old foundation of a visible Messiah, and adopted the new one, of an invisible and spiritual Messiah. But if the theory of visions is a rational explanation of the facts, not only must the appearances, and the interviews, have been visionary, but the instructions must have been so likewise. What does this mean? That the whole foundation on which the Church of Jesus Christ has been erected – that great Society which has acted mightily on man for good daring eighteen centuries of time – is the creation of the fatuous dreamings of a number of disordered imaginations; and all this, we are invited to accept in the name of reason, and philosophy, rather than admit the reality of a miracle.

It will probably be objected that Mahometanism is a case of this description, and that as far as it is not founded on imposture, it rests on the unreal dreams of the prophet of Mecca; and on appearances of the angel Gabriel, which, unless they were deliberate inventions, Mahomet must have mistaken for realities.*

*It is not my purpose in this place to draw a general parallel between Christianity and Mahometanism, but simply between the two systems, as far as they can be supposed to have originated in some mental hallucination, in the supposed visionary appearances of the angel Gabriel to Mahomet, those of Our Lord to the Apostles, and the erection of Christianity and Mahometanism on the basis of these delusions.

The perusal of the Koran leaves on my own mind the impression, that during the earlier portion of his career the Arabian prophet may have been a sincere fanatic. No less certain is the impression produced by that part of it which is latest in date, that his fanaticism had become united with no small amount of imposture. There are chapters in it which no one in the possession of his senses could have believed that he received from the angel Gabriel, or that they were written on the eternal tablets of the divine mind. On the whole, Mahomet seems to have belonged to that mixed and very mysterious order of character which we occasionally meet with in history and in actual life, which unites self-delusion, fanaticism, and imposture in nearly equal proportions.

But it will be urged, that on the strength of his conviction of the reality of the appearances of the angel, he laid claim to a divine Mission, and on this foundation has succeeded in erecting the Mahomedan Church, and thus a hallucination has been the means of creating a great reality.

I answer, that the assertion is inaccurate, that Mahomet succeeded in erecting his Church on this basis. The utmost that can be affirmed is that he was induced to undertake his thirteen years’ peaceful mission at Mecca under the persuasion that he had received a divine commission through the appearance of the angel. The results of his peaceful labours however were so inconsiderable, that the small band of believers whom he collected never succeeded in constituting a Church; and if he had confined himself to such labours the Church of Mahomet would never have been created. And no wonder, for the prophet never once made any manifestation of superhuman goodness, holiness or power which could impart credibility to his testimony. He stood in the position of a mere man witnessing to himself, precisely corresponding to what Our Lord meant when He said, “If I bear witness of myself, my witness is not true.” His visions he saw alone, and whether they were pure delusions, or these united with an incipient form of that self-delusion which manifested itself in the latter portion of his career, they failed to create a Church until be grasped the sword. There are passages in the Koran which produce the painful impression that even at an early date a spirit of self-delusion was mixed up with his fanaticism. I allude to those in which he assumes a tone of deprecation, on account of his inability to perform a miracle, when his opponents challenged him to work one in attestation of his divine mission. But the real foundation of his Church dates from his advancement to sovereign power, which a fortunate combination of circumstances threw into his hands. With this event begins that portion of his career in which unquestionable self-delusion and imposture become united with the original fanaticism of his character. We cannot now trace the stages of his downward course, but it is probable that his change from fanaticism pure and simple to fanaticism combined with imposture was a gradual one. However this may have been, the contrast between the Christian and the Mahometan Churches is complete, not only in the mode of their foundation, but almost in every other particular. With the possession of royal authority Mahomet ceased to be the missionary, and grasped the sword, his successful use of which formed in the eyes of his followers the real vindication of his divine Mission, and constitutes the foundation on which his Church has been erected. Jesus renounced the sword and was crucified; His cross became His throne; His followers proclaimed Him a spiritual Messiah, who would conquer his kingdom, not by force but by persuasion; and on the basis of His resurrection found His Catholic Church, over which for eighteen centuries He has reigned as its invisible King. If then, as unbelievers allege, the Church of Jesus Christ has been founded on a body of visionary delusions, it is certain that the Church of Mahomet has been founded on the sternest of realities, the sword wielded by the conqueror’s hand.

But the theory of visions breaks down at every point where it can be tested by the facts of history. Not only is it the most certain of facts that the Church was reconstructed on the basis of the Resurrection within a very brief interval after the Crucifixion, but it rapidly increased in numbers. To make converts was a necessity of its existence. How could this be effected? There was only one mode, viz. to proclaim the setting up of the New Messianic kingdom; and that the person whom the chiefs of the nation had recently crucified on the charge of being a false Christ, had risen from the dead and become its spiritual King. What did His adversaries, who had just compassed His death, say when within a few weeks they saw what they must have considered a new imposture set up, and multitudes joining the new Society? There was one simple way of crushing the movement – the production of the body. No amount of delusion on the part of the followers of Jesus could have resisted the logic of such an act. If they were unable to produce it, the only possible reason must have been that it had passed from their custody into that of His friends. But such a supposition is destructive of the entire theory of visions; for in that case the belief in His resurrection cannot have been the result of any delusion, but its sole source must have been a deliberately concocted fraud. If, on the other hand, the body was still in the custody of His enemies, it is simply incredible that when the Resurrection was publicly announced they would not have produced it. However the fact may have been, either way it is fatal to the visionary theory. Its only refuge is to suppose that some one stole the body, and thereupon the remainder of His disciples took to seeing visions of the risen Jesus; but for such a fraud it is impossible to assign any adequate motive, and that it became the basis of a set of visionary appearances which were mistaken for realities is incredible.

Pressed by this difficulty some of the adherents of this theory have affirmed that the followers of Jesus retired from Jerusalem after the crucifixion of their Master, to more friendly Galilee; and that these took to seeing visions of Him raised from the dead, and to reconstructing the Church.* The object of this is to gain time for the belief to grow; and to remove the scene of action to a distance from the place of the Crucifixion. The supposition however is not only devoid of all evidence, but directly contradicts the testimony of the Pauline Epistles. These render it certain that the Church was set up at Jerusalem within a very brief interval after the Crucifixion; and that it grew to sufficient numbers to induce the authorities, aided by Paul, to commence against it a sharp persecution. On this point, we are not dependent on the testimony of the Acts; but we have St. Paul’s own direct affirmation. This being so, it is certain that both the priests and Paul must have made every exertion to discover the source of the delusion; the necessity of exhibiting the remains of the body, if it was in their possession, was therefore a thing too palpable to be overlooked. Equally certain is it, that if the body, or even its remains, could have been produced, the Church could never have made another convert. Besides, of all the means which were employed to put the Church down, and to convict the alleged witnesses of the Resurrection of delusion or fraud, Paul must have known the minute details; and as the agent of the priests in the persecution, he must have been entrusted with their secret theory as to the origin of the delusion; yet he joined the Church.

*The only ground for this assumption is the message sent to the disciples through the women on the morning of the Resurrection: “Go and tell my brethren, that they go before me into Galilee; there shall they see me”; the assertion in St. Matthew’s Gospel, that the eleven disciples did see Him in Galilee, and that of the fourth Gospel, which, while it affirms that He was twice previously seen by the Apostolic body at Jerusalem, tells us also that He was seen by seven disciples in Galilee. It should be observed that all three Synoptics concur in stating that the scene of the origin of the belief in the Resurrection was at Jerusalem, prior to any of the disciples leaving it for Galilee. This being so, it is absurd to accept their testimony in the one case and to deny its validity in the other. But, as I have shown above, it is impossible that St. Paul could have been ignorant where the belief originated. Every circumstance connected with him as a persecutor proves that it must have taken a firm root in Jerusalem shortly after the Crucifixion; and that the theory of its having gradually grown up in Galilee, has no other foundation than the imagination of those who have propounded it.

The following conclusions are established by the preceding reasonings.

First: the theory of visions totally fails to give us a rational account of the origin of the belief in the Resurrection, and of the unquestionable fact, that the Church was reconstructed on its basis.

Secondly: that if this theory be accepted as a solution of the facts of history, it involves a succession of events equally miraculous with those which it has been propounded for the express purpose of explaining away.

IV. Against the cogency of these reasonings however an objection has been urged by an eminent modern physiologist, to which it would be a neglect of duty on my part not to give a serious consideration.* It is the more necessary to do so, because there can be no doubt that it is one which is felt by no inconsiderable number of thoughtful men. It is to be regretted that in the form in which the objection has been urged, it is one against the general objective reality of the miracles recorded in the Bible, and not against the specific miracle of the Resurrection. As, however, it is useless to propound a theory, which assigns all these miracles, as far as they are not of legendary origin, to that class of phenomena in which mental hallucinations have been mistaken for external realities, while the Resurrection, the one great evidential miracle of the New Testament, is left untouched, I feel fully justified in concluding that it is intended to be equally applicable to the Resurrection, as well as to the other miracles of the Bible. Otherwise it would be simply nugatory, as it is clear that if the Resurrection was an objective reality, we do not require narrowly to scrutinise the attestation of each of the other miracles of the New Testament; but may be content with the general one which is given by the evangelists.** It cannot be too strongly impressed on both sides to this controversy, that the Resurrection is the one great crucial miracle, and with it Christianity as a divine revelation stands or falls. The objection may be briefly stated as follows:–

*Dr. Carpenter lays down, in an article in the Contemporary Review, entitled “The Fallacies of Testimony,” certain principles which he considers will explain the miracles of the New Testament, and states that “in regard to the New Testament miracles generally, he fails to see in what respect the external testimony in their behalf is stronger than it is for the reality of the miracles attributed to St. Columba,” (I quote the entire passage in a Supplement to this Lecture, which see). The expression used is “the New Testament miracles generally.” The ordinary reader can only understand that under this expression is included the Resurrection of Our Lord, which is certainly the greatest miracle recorded in the New Testament. This paper was read at a Meeting of the Clergy at Sion College shortly before its publication; and in the printed Syllabus he distinctly invites theologians to join issue with his positions. I have been informed, however, that at the Meeting in question, Dr. Carpenter admitted that some of the principles which he there laid down would not account for the belief in the Resurrection. If this be so, it is greatly to be regretted that he has not stated in his published paper that such is the case; for it is impossible for the reader to arrive at any other conclusion than that the Resurrection must be included among “the New Testament miracles generally.” What Dr. Carpenter’s views are respecting the Resurrection, and how he explains the origin of the belief in it, I am ignorant; but it seems to me that if he believes in its objective reality, it is inconceivable that he should put himself to the trouble of explaining away the other miracles, while he leaves the Resurrection untouched. At any rate, I can only deal with his published writings, and not with any private explanations of his views. There is no doubt that the whole tendency of the article in question is not only to shake the reader’s belief in the truth of the miracles of the New Testament generally, but in the objective reality of the Resurrection. Most of the principles laid down in the article for the purpose of accounting for the belief in a number of well-attested miraculous narratives, and also for that in the phenomena of spiritualism, are unfolded at much greater length in his work on “Mental Physiology.” He is of opinion that these spiritualistic phenomena, which rest on a very high form of attestation, are the result of certain abnormal actions of the mind. It is impossible to read his explanations of the origin of these and of various other delusions, without feeling that the principles employed, if true, are capable of being used to bolster up “the theory of Visions,” the fallacies of which it is the object of this Lecture to expose. Thus in “the Fallacies of Testimony” we are referred to the case of twelve witnesses, who were firmly persuaded that they saw a person descend through the ceiling of a closed and darkened room. I need hardly say, that the story is an ugly parody of the appearance of Our Lord to the Apostles at Easter Eve. It may fairly be asked, if Dr. Carpenter’s principles are true solutions of the origin of the belief in the one, why are they not equally applicable to account for the belief in the other? It has, therefore, been my simple duty, irrespective of what may be his view about the Resurrection, to point out, not only the contrast in point of evidence between that of all other miraculous narratives and of Our Lord’s Resurrection, but also to show that the principles on which he accounts for the belief of numbers of men of cultivated intellects and of some men of eminent scientific attainments, in the phenomena of spiritualism and other similar species of supernaturalism, are totally inadequate to account for the origin of the belief in the Resurrection of Jesus Christ. See Supplement II, Lecture VII.

**What I mean is that even if some of the miracles recorded in the Gospels could be shown to have been incorrectly reported, or to have been the results of the action of powerful faith on the bodies of those who were cured by Our Lord or the Apostles, while the truth of the Resurrection remains unshaken. Christianity loses none of its claims to be accepted as a Divine Revelation. All that this position, if established, could effect, would be to alter our views as to the degree of supernatural assistance afforded to the authors of the Gospels. To offer specific objections against particular miracles, while the greatest of all miracles remains untouched, is to evade, not to solve, time question at issue.

There are a considerable number of miraculous narratives which as far as attestation goes, rest on an exceedingly strong one; yet their objective reality is not believed by those who have investigated the subject. As however in many cases imposture is out of the question, and it is incontestable that those who have reported them were firmly convinced that they had witnessed them, the only possible mode of accounting for such beliefs is, by assuming that they are the result of mental hallucination.* That the human mind under certain well-known conditions is capable of mistaking subjective impressions for external realities is a thoroughly established scientific fact.** Equally so is it, that a powerful mental action, when concentrated on some portion of our bodily frame, is capable of producing results, which to the unskilled observer have all the appearance of being miraculous.*** Among the mental conditions capable of producing such a state of mind are unconscious cerebration, prepossession, fixed idea, and that strong expectancy of an event which bears no inconsiderable analogy to what Christians designate faith.**** These, and other similar principles, have in numerous well-attested cases produced impressions of a purely subjective character, which have led persons in other respects possessed of a clear discriminating judgment, to mistake them for external realities. It is urged therefore that if the existence of such delusions in men of otherwise sound judgment is an unquestionable scientific fact, this forms a rational account of the origin of the beliefs in all those well-attested miraculous narratives, which it is impossible to believe to have originated in deliberate fraud. From this the inference has been drawn that it will afford an equally reasonable account of the origin of the miracles recorded in the New Testament. Such is the objection stated in a general form.

*Of these, the phenomena sworn to by multitudes of credible witnesses, and accepted by intelligent judges, as objective realities in connection with the witch mania and those of spiritualism, may be cited as crucial examples.

**A large number of well-attested instances of spectral illusions, place this beyond the possibility of doubt. The remarkable fact is that such spectral illusions have been often witnessed by persons whose mental faculties are in other respects sound. The illusions of which I am speaking occur however only in individual cases; many persons do not concur in beholding the same object.

***While the power of the mind to act on the body is an unquestionable fact, the limits of its action are, in our present state of scientific knowledge, extremely obscure. Limits, however, certainly exist; and it is no less certain that a considerable number of the miracles recorded in the New Testament lie outside then.

****I have only here enumerated the chief of those which are referred to by Dr. Carpenter in his work on “Mental Physiology,” having only to do with those which bear directly on the question of the reality of the miracles recorded in the New Testament, and above all, of Our Lord’s Resurrection.

The first observation which I would make respecting it is that it makes no distinction between the various classes of miracles which are recorded in its pages. I shall not dispute that there are some which, taken by themselves, and detached from the great character who must have believed that He performed them, may be assigned to causes such as those which have been enumerated by the eminent physiologist above referred to.* But this is to overlook the main point in the Christian argument, as I have exhibited it in the preceding Lectures, resolving, as it does, the whole matter into a question of simple attestation and the sincerity of the beliefs of those who supposed that they had witnessed them. I must repeat it again, that while the Christian miracles rest on a strong attestation, this forms only a portion of the grounds on which we accept them, viz., their connection with the divine Christ, and the powerful influence which has been exerted by Him for good in the moral and spiritual world during eighteen centuries of time. Events which, taken by themselves, may be difficult to believe on an extremely strong attestation, assume a wholly different character when viewed in connection with their attendant circumstances. To treat the question of the reality of the Christian miracles as a simple one of attestation, and nothing more, is entirely to overlook one of the most important points of the argument.

*To this class would belong the expulsion of demons; such cures as were slow and gradual, as those referred to in the Epistle of St. James, when he speaks of the efficacy of the prayer of faith, and the anointing of the sick with oil in the name of the Lord; probably the cures effected by the passing of St. Peter’s shadow over the sick, and the application of garments taken from St. Paul’s person, and in general, those diseases whose immediate cause is disorder of the nervous system; but resurrections from the dead, restoring sight to the blind, hearing to the deaf, sound limbs to the maimed, and several others, belong to a wholly different category.

Next. The objection not only confounds together the miracles in the Gospel in a mass, but even complicates them with those in the Old Testament, which stand in a very different position even in point of attestation. I must insist, therefore, on confining the discussion to the real point at issue, and not allowing it to be extended over an indefinite range of subject matter; for the only question worth considering is, does it afford an adequate solution of the origin of the belief in the Resurrection? If the objection fails to account for this miracle, it is simply futile. It is deeply to be regretted that in these discussions unbelievers fail to recognize that this forms the key of the Christian position, which if it can be firmly held, carries with it all the other miracles of the Gospels; and if it cannot be retained, renders the defence or attack on them a useless expenditure of labour, for if it is a fact that Jesus Christ did not rise from the dead, Christianity must have originated in some form of mental hallucination.

I by no means wish to deny that there are narratives of miracles the evidence for which, viewed as a simple question of attestation and of the sincerity of those who have reported them, is stronger than that which we consider necessary to establish the truth of ordinary facts. As many of these are well known, I need not particularize them. They belong to times past; and the discussion of their truth or falsehood is wholly unnecessary in reference to the present controversy. We need not go for well-attested miraculous narratives to the history of the past. We have one of the best, if not the best attested instance of this form of supernaturalism in the midst of us, and occurring, I may say, before our eyes, in the phenomena of Spiritualism; and I ought perhaps to add, in the recently reported miracles in France. I will confine my observations, however, to the former, as it is a subject which has been carefully investigated by the author whose positions I am considering. I have already pointed out the strength of the attestation on which these phenomena rest, and therefore need not further allude to it.

It will be no duty of mine to discuss how far they have originated in fraud or hallucination, or have some foundation in causes hitherto unobserved. I have simply to do with their bearing on the Christian argument, and on the evidence for the objective reality of Our Lord’s resurrection. I shall therefore only briefly state the conclusion at which the authority above alluded to has arrived, after having spent several years in the careful investigation of the subject. He is of opinion that after making every allowance for the existence of a large amount of fraud, there remains a considerable residuum of phenomena which cannot be referred to imposture as their origin; and when we consider the persons who have declared their deliberate conviction that they have witnessed them, and the circumstances under which they are alleged to have been manifested, that the idea that they have been the dupes of mere trickery is out of the question. If, therefore, we assume (as the author in question, in company with the majority of intelligent men, does) that they are unreal, the only way of accounting for them is to suppose that they are subjective impressions mistaken for external realities, and he proposes the mental states which I have mentioned above, viz., unconscious cerebration, prepossession, fixed idea, expectancy, and a few others, as adequate to account for the phenomena. As a result of this, we are asked to show that since it would be difficult to prove that the miracles of the New Testament rest on a stronger attestation than these phenomena, the belief in them may not be accounted for in a similar manner.

Viewing it therefore as an argument against the objective reality of the Resurrection, I shall do it no injustice if I put it as follows: – If eminent men of science, physicians, lawyers, even judges, and considerable numbers of men of cultivated intellect, and who have proved themselves not to have been deficient in common sense in other departments of thought, have, under the influence of these mental conditions, mistaken subjective impressions, the pure creations of their own minds, for objective realities, is it not equally likely that the simple minded followers of Jesus were a prey to similar hallucinations; and, consequently, that the belief in the Resurrection may have owed its origin to delusions of this description? Or to put the same objection from another point of view: – If these phenomena are the work of cunning impostors, who have succeeded in imposing on men of highly cultivated intellects, what guarantee have we that the belief in the miracles of the Gospels, the Resurrection included, has not originated in the followers of Our Lord having been deluded by a similar imposture? If, on the other hand, we assume that they are objectively real, then miracles would cease to have any evidential value, for they would be undistinguishable from this species of natural phenomena, and would afford no evidence of the presence of a superhuman power. As however few whose opinions are of weight will adopt this alternative, it will be needless to discuss its possibility.

Although the reasonings which I have urged in the course of this Lecture against the theory of visions are virtual answers to the difficulties involved in this special form of the objection, yet as a direct challenge has been offered to theologians by any eminent man of science, to distinguish between the evidence which can be adduced for the phenomena of spiritualism and other well-attested miraculous narratives, which are no longer believed by intelligent persons, and that which can be adduced for the reality of the miracles of the New Testament, including Our Lord’s resurrection, I will point out definitely in what this distinction consists.

1. The three principles, of Prepossession, Fixed Idea, and Expectancy, which have been laid down as the three chief causes, which render it possible to mistake subjective impressions for objective realities, are incapable of affording any rational account of the origin of the belief in the Resurrection. How far they may be adequate to account for the belief in other miraculous narratives, it will be no part of my duty to inquire. The defender of Christianity has to deal with the Resurrection, and the Resurrection alone. I observe therefore that neither of these three states of mind could have impelled the followers of Jesus to mistake visions of their risen Master for external realities, and this for the simplest of all reasons, viz., that as far as any fixed idea, prepossession, or expectancy of His resurrection is concerned, they must have been nonexistent. Instead of expectancy, they must have been in a state of profound despondency, which prepossession or fixed idea could have had no tendency to dissipate. Nothing therefore can be more certain than, whatever influence these principles may have had, in generating the beliefs in the miraculous narratives referred to by Dr. Carpenter, they can have had nothing to do with producing a belief in the Resurrection.

2. Not only are they inadequate, but as far as they could have exerted any influence at all, it would have been in a contrary direction. I have proved that not only must the disciples collectively have had visions of Jesus raised from the dead, if their belief was a delusion, but also that they must have held imaginary conversations with Him, in which they believed that they received His instructions as to the reconstruction of His Church.* To this last fact it is impossible to attach too great importance in dealing with this question. Most certain too is the fact that the Church was reconstructed on a new basis shortly after the Crucifixion; and the conditions of the case prove the truth of that which our documents affirm, that this reconstruction took place in consequence of the conviction of the disciples that they had received definite instructions from their Master to this effect. This being so, if the belief in the Resurrection was the result of mistaking visionary appearances for realities, the supposed instructions must have been equally visionary. Consequently, if fixed idea, prepossession, and expectancy were sufficiently potent in the minds of the disciples to have created visions of the risen Jesus, they must have created the instructions likewise. But these instructions involved the reconstruction of the Church on a new basis. It is evident, therefore, that they could not have owed their origin to the principles in question; for if they can be supposed capable of creating a set of visionary instructions they would certainly have been in conformity with their old Messianic prepossessions, and we should have heard nothing of reconstructing the Church on a new basis. Prepossession brings out only what was previously in the mind. Fixed idea is the opposite to change. Of expectancy I have already sufficiently disposed.**

*That such instructions were believed to have been given is distinctly affirmed in Acts 1:3.

**It is simply marvellous that Dr. Carpenter should have written the following passage: – “I fail to see in what respect the external testimony in behalf of the New Testament miracles generally is stronger than it is for the reality of the miracles attributed to St. Columba.” What is meant by external testimony? Surely not the bare counting of the heads of the witnesses, and deciding by a majority without any reference to their intrinsic weight. It is impossible to separate the external testimony from the whole of the attendant circumstances. As I have observed above, the testimony which would be utterly invalid to establish a fact under one set of conditions may be more than sufficient to establish its truth under wholly different ones. The animation, therefore, that the resurrection of Jesus Christ, or even that His other miracles rest on no stronger external testimony than those of St. Columba, is to me all but incomprehensible. Dr. Carpenter evidently allows that attendant circumstances form a portion of what he designates external testimony. “No fewer,” says he, “than thirty-two separate religious foundations among the Scots, twenty-one among the Picts, and thirty-seven among the Irish, many of which occupied conspicuous places in the monastic history of the earlier middle ages, seem to have been planted by himself or his immediate disciples. ... The point on which I wish to lay stress is the continuity of the history as trustworthy as any such history can be.” But surely the contrast is clear and distinct. If St. Columba and his followers have founded ninety monasteries which have since perished, Jesus Christ and His followers have founded the Christian Church, which after eighteen centuries of energetic life, is vigorous still. St. Columba has exerted some inconsiderable influence on the history of the Scots and Irish; Jesus Christ has exerted the mightiest influence on the history of man – an influence which at the present hour is capable of verification. The miracle of the Resurrection created the Christian Church, and the proof of its falsehood would subvert it. This is the most certain of facts: but that St. Columba’s monasteries rested on the simple basis of his miracles, or that they have perished because his miracles have been disbelieved, we have no evidence to prove. I therefore put the case thus, although it only imperfectly represents the reality of the contrast. Not only will the evidence for the truth of the miracles of St. Columba bear no comparison with that which can be adduced for the resurrection of Jesus Christ, but in accordance with the principle referred to in a former note, the evidence which may be powerless to prove the performance of miracles in connection with such a personage as St. Columba may be more than sufficient to prove them in connection with one who is not only the one great Catholic man, whose influence I have endeavoured to describe in the second, third, and fourth Lectures of this course, but who lies exerted an influence for good “greater than that of all the disquisitions of philosophers, and than all the exhortations of moralists.”

3. The points which I have established in the former Lectures constitute the plainest distinction between the evidence of the miracles of the New Testament, and above all, of the Resurrection, and that of all other miraculous narratives; for not only does that divine life furnish an adequate reason for the existence of the miracles; but the one is the counterpart of the other. I have proved that the energetic presence of a superhuman power in Christianity is a verifiable fact in the history of the past, and of the present. Of this power the miracle of the Resurrection is the foundation. However strong may be the persuasion of various intelligent persons, that they have witnessed a number of occurrences which we cannot distinguish from miracles, not one of them can produce an attestation of this description. The resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead has operated mightily during eighteen centuries of history, and is operating mightily at this hour. To spiritualism and other kindred phenomena, the language of the old prophet, may still be applied with perfect justice: “Show us things that are to come hereafter, that we may know that ye are gods; yea, do good, or do evil, that we may be dismayed, and behold it together. Behold ye are of nothing, and your work of nought.”

4. The belief in the Resurrection has created the Catholic Church of Jesus Christ and all the mighty results which it has wrought in history. The spiritualistic and other kindred marvels have created, and to all appearance will create, no institution either good or evil.

5. The resurrection of Jesus Christ has operated as the most elevating power which has been exerted on mankind. These alleged manifestations, with their kindred phenomena, instead of elevating men, degrade them.*

*Mr. Wallace is not insensible to the fact that the silliness of a large number of the communications from the spirit world forms a very serious obstacle to the belief in their objective reality. His explanation of it is very singular, I might almost say, if the subject were not so serious a one, amusing. It is as follows: – A large majority of those who die have during life habitually talked nonsense; it is therefore no wonder if, when they have entered into the world of spirits, they still continue to do so, and only raise themselves above it by slow and gradual steps. I also refer to another of his positions as showing the tendency of these views. He informs us that numerous as have been the communications from the spirit world, some of which are of an elevated character, its inhabitants, as far as these communications have yet informed us, know no more about God and Christ than we do. Yet this eminent scientific observer tells us that from a Sadducean unbelief in the existence of a spiritual world he has been converted by the stern logic of facts.

6. While the Resurrection has changed the history of the world, the spiritualistic manifestations, including the best attested miraculous stories, have been barren of result. Yet if the former were objective realities, they must certainly have been able to produce very palpable results. It is clear that they could largely aid the administration of justice in the detection of crime; but in this respect they neither do good, nor do evil. No passion is stronger in the human mind than the love of gain. Yet if the facts reported are not delusions, these manifestations must be able to afford the means of gratifying it. But while the resurrection of Jesus Christ is the key which unlocks all the events of history, manifestations of this kind effect and have effected nothing.

7. Our judgment of the credibility of facts does not rest on mere attestation, but is largely modified by the consideration whether the actions are in conformity with the character of the agents. Here again the contrast between the miracles of Christianity and the best attested of all other miraculous narratives is complete. Those recorded in the New Testament are all worthy of the great Character to whom they are attributed. The other class are so undignified and grotesque, as to destroy the weight of the testimony which is alleged in their favour.

8. For the occurrence of the Resurrection and the other miracles of the New Testament an adequate reason can be assigned. They form a portion of a divine revelation, which is in harmony with the facts of the moral and spiritual world. But the spiritualistic phenomena are out of harmony with all the known facts of the universe; and if real, would be destructive of its moral order.

9. Even as a question of mere testimony the contrast is no less complete. The resurrection of Jesus, when it was first reported, could have been subjected to the test of verification, by the simple production of His body, by those who denied its reality. It is impossible for our opponents to subject the phenomena in question to any similar test.

10. The altered form, and the want of immediate recognition of the risen Jesus on the part of His followers has been alleged as a ground for believing that the appearance must have been visionary, and unreal; and at first sight the objection seems not devoid of plausibility. I reply however that on the contrary, it forms a proof of truthfulness, such as is possessed by no other supernatural occurrence. The fact, as stated by the Evangelists, is strictly in conformity with the conditions of the case. What is the real affirmation made? Not that Jesus was raised to die again; but with a body no longer subject to the conditions of mortality. This being so, it is not only in the highest degree probable – I may say, it is certain – if the Resurrection was an objective reality, that the body in which He rose from the dead, would have undergone some species of transformation from that which He wore previously to His crucifixion. If the Evangelists had asserted that there was no difficulty in recognizing Him, it would have cast suspicion on their entire narrative. But if the belief in the Resurrection had been the result of mistaking subjective impressions for objective realities, the last thing which would have occurred to them would have been to attribute an altered appearance to their risen Master. Neither unconscious cerebration, fixed idea, prepossession, or expectancy, can account for so remarkable a fact.

Such are the obvious distinctions between the evidence for Our Lord’s resurrection and that which can be adduced in favour of the best attested of other miraculous occurrences.

Let me notice one further objection which has been adduced against the miracles of the New Testament before I dismiss this portion of the subject. It has been alleged that some of them may be accounted for as the result of the action of powerful faith or expectancy on the bodily frame, and that it is a well-known fact that such an effect is possible, and that to such a degree, as to bear to the uninitiated the appearance of a miracle. As this objection requires more space for its discussion than can be given to it here, I will offer a few remarks on it in a Supplement. For the present it will be sufficient to observe, that as an objection against the Christian miracles it is futile; for it is impossible to account for the origin of the belief in the resurrection of Our Lord on any such principle; and until this can be done, the attempt to explain away the other miracles recorded in the New Testament as the result of natural causes, is a mere was to of time and ingenuity.

V. The theory of visions being thus proved to be untenable, there only remains one alternative to the acceptance of the Resurrection as a fact which it will be necessary to discuss at length, viz., the theory which affirms that Jesus did not die from the effects of His crucifixion, but that He was taken down in a state of syncope, which was mistaken for death; that He gradually recovered; and that in some inaccurate rendering of this fact has originated the belief of the Resurrection. As this theory has been propounded by several eminent writers, it will be necessary to give it a brief consideration, although it is encumbered with many of the difficulties which attend the theory of visions, and with several which are peculiarly its own.

Respecting the chief facts on which the question must be discussed there will be no disagreement. It will be readily admitted that crucifixion did not necessarily involve the death of the crucified person. If he were taken down in time and carefully attended to, recovery was possible, although the chances were against it. This we know from the testimony of Josephus, who procured the order of Titus for taking down from the cross three of his crucified friends, after they had been suspended for several hours. By means of careful treatment one recovered, while two died. As, however, the Jews were at this time crucified by the Romans by thousands, it may be a question whether they all underwent the terrible infliction of a scourging previously to being fastened to the cross, – a point which must have an important bearing on the probability of recovery. The time too which, according to the accounts of the Evangelists, elapsed between Our Lord’s crucifixion and His death, was not sufficient under ordinary circumstances to have extinguished life. It has, therefore, been affirmed that we have no evidence that He actually died; that it is highly probable that He did not, and that His recovery was in some way or other mistaken for a resurrection.

Respecting the possibility of recovery under such circumstances, the question into whose hands the body was committed is a vital one. The only authority for affirming that His friends obtained possession of it is that of our Evangelists.* But if their affirmation is good for this, it must be admitted to be so for a great deal more. To surrender the body for honorable burial would have been contrary to the Roman practice. His Jewish adversaries, who brought about His crucifixion, and the soldiers who accomplished it, and who from the frequency of such executions must have been familiar with the symptoms of that kind of death, were not likely to have allowed the body to pass out of their custody while life remained. If on the other hand the body continued in the custody of His enemies, recovery would have been impossible.

*It is very singular to observe the facility with which those against whose opinions I am reasoning quote the Gospels as authorities, when they can find any fact or allusion in them which can be made to favour their own views, while in other respects they treat them as unhistorical.

But viewed as an historical question, the supposition that the story of the Resurrection has originated in a recovery from the effects of crucifixion, is negatived by the following facts: – The theory is a purely modern invention. None of the adversaries of Christianity during the early ages, when crucifixion still continued a common mode of punishment, ever expressed a suspicion on the subject. It is clear that such a suspicion never crossed the minds of His Jewish adversaries; nor had it ever occurred to the Apostle Paul, who, when he was a persecutor, must have investigated the entire subject; and after he became a Christian, must certainly have known whether Jesus was living somewhere in retirement, or had since expired from exhaustion or premature decay. Consequently, although it is not denied that a person who had been crucified might escape with his life, if carefully attended to, the facts above referred to demolish utterly the theory that it can have been the case in this particular instance.

But even, if it were not so, the affirmation that we have no evidence that Jesus really died, would be quite irrelevant to the present issue; for it is not only necessary to prove that he may not have died, but that he actually did not – and then the far more serious duty is incumbent on those who propound this theory to show how it is possible that the story of the Resurrection and the reconstruction of the Church on it as its basis, can have originated, if the only foundation on which it rested was that Jesus slowly recovered from His wounds, lived somewhere for a while in retirement, and afterwards shared the common fate of mortality.

But let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that Jesus awoke from a state of syncope or swoon in the sepulchre in which he was laid by His friends in the belief that He had expired; that He succeeded in creeping to the house of some friend,* where under careful treatment He recovered, and that He thereupon withdrew into retirement, out of the reach of His enemies. How, I ask, could such facts as these have become the foundation of the belief in His resurrection, and of the reconstruction of the Church on the basis of His spiritual Messiahship? We shall doubtless be told that such a belief might grow up after a time among a body of very credulous people.** How long, I ask, is the interval that would be required for its growth? Would it be a few days, weeks, months or years? I feel confident that if those who propound this theory will carefully consider the question, the shortest interval which they will demand as necessary for the growth of such a delusion, will be vastly in excess of that which the unquestionable historical conditions of the case can concede to them.

*It should be observed that this supposition is attended with difficulties which are insuperable. First: it involves the assumption that He was buried in a sepulchre, and not in a common grave. If He had been interred in the latter, no resuscitation would have been possible. But the fact that He was interred in a sepulchre we learn only from the pages of the Evangelists. Independently of their testimony nothing would have been more improbable than that such should have been the case, as to surrender a criminal for honourable burial would have been contrary to Roman custom. Secondly: a sepulchre would have been a place very unfavourable to the supposed recovery, which must have been sufficiently complete to have enabled Him to convey Himself to the house of a friend. To aid in effecting it, the assistance of the spices used at the burial has been invoked. How far they would have been useful for this purpose I know not; but here again the fact that the body was wrapped up with them is known only from the pages of the Evangelists; and, taken by itself, would under the circumstances have been an occurrence in the highest degree improbable. Thirdly: it is difficult to imagine how a man in such a state of extreme exhaustion as that which is presupposed could have succeeded in freeing himself from the bandages and wrappings in which he was incased. Fourthly: if on leaving the sepulchre those who interred the body closed up the entrance, it is difficult to imagine by what means short of a miracle a man in this wounded and lacerated condition could have obtained egress from the tomb; and that the sepulchre was left open is simply incredible. Nothing is easier than to affirm that He succeeded in getting out of the sepulchre, and in taking refuge with a friend; but the, question must be answered, how was this possible under the circumstances? In this world of facts it is useless to make assumptions which conflict with the realities of things, and then propound them as a philosophical explanation of the origin of the greatest institution that has ever existed among men.

**Nothing is more common in this controversy than the vague assertion that such a belief would grow up in the course of time. The fact is, that the time at command for the growth of myths, legends, tendencies, and compromises, in short, for the whole apparatus necessary for the manufacture of the Christ of the Gospels and Epistles, out of a purely human Jesus, is very limited and definite. In this respect criticism is in a very disadvantageous position, compared with those scientific modern speculators, who seek to manufacture this Universe and all its wondrous adaptations, without the intervention of an intelligent Creator. The latter have eternity at their back; the indefinite periods of which they can play with as counters; the former are confronted at every step by the stern facts of history and the realities of human life.

Let us suppose that He succeeded in taking refuge in the house of a friend; in that case the matter must have been kept profoundly secret in order to prevent it from coming to the ears of His enemies; and it would have been impossible during the time of His gradual recovery, and until He had escaped to some place of safety, to breathe one word about His resurrection, lest their, suspicions should be aroused. How long, I ask, did all this take? At any rate, he must either have died under cure, or slowly recovered. If we accept the former alternative, then most of the difficulties which I have discussed in connection with the theory of visions must be surmounted before it is possible to erect the belief in the Resurrection on such a basis; and in addition to these, it is impossible to advance one step without assuming that some one or more of His friends must have been guilty of a deliberate fraud. If, on the other hand, it is assumed that He recovered, how, I ask, in the name of common sense, could it have been possible to mistake a gradual recovery for a resurrection from the dead? Is it believable that Jesus Himself could have laboured under the delusion that His awakening in agony from His wounds in the tomb, His retirement to the house of a friend; His gradual recovery, and His survival in an exhausted condition, was an actual resurrection from the dead? If the real facts were such as this theory assumes them to have been, I feel confident that the overwhelming majority of those who do not desire to prop up a foregone conclusion, will agree that the only way in which it can have given rise to the belief in the Resurrection, is that it must have been a deliberately concocted fraud; or, in other words, that the Gospel of holiness is based on a foundation of conscious imposture.

But further, if the belief was set on foot by two or three disciples, how were the others to be got to accept it without being favoured with a sight of Him? Some story must have been invented to make the matter plausible. What could have been the form of it? Is it believable that the other disciples at once accepted the tale as a veritable reality without receiving any information as to what was become of Him? Nor is this all. It must never be forgotten that the Church had to be reconstructed, and a claim of Messiahship set up on this as a new basis. Who suggested the change? Will any one affirm that it was Jesus Himself? Yet it is impossible to believe that his followers would venture to change His Messianic character from that of a visible to an invisible Christ, while they believed that He was living in retirement, unless they had also believed that He had given definite instructions to do so. If then we would avoid charging Jesus and His followers with a deliberately planned pious fraud, we must assume that He must not only have mistaken His gradual recovery for a resurrection, but deliberately determined to shift the basis of his Messiahship; and while living for the remainder of His life in privacy out of the reach of His enemies, to direct His disciples to propagate the belief that He was risen from the dead, and on this foundation to erect His Church.

If this be true, it is impossible to account for it on any theory which is consistent with honesty. It is impossible to believe that a man who had claimed to be the Messiah; who by that claim had so provoked the public authorities that they had procured his crucifixion; who only slowly recovered from his wounds, and kept himself for the remainder of his life in retirement, could have believed himself to be the Christ; or that those of his followers who had access to him could have mistaken him for one.

Further: if Jesus died shortly after His supposed resurrection, some of His followers must have been cognisant of the fact. In that case it is impossible to acquit them of having invented the fiction that He had left the world, and gone up into heaven. If, on the other hand, we suppose that He remained several years in retirement, the same fiction must have been propagated while He was still living. In either case, the most liberal attribution of credulity and enthusiasm to His followers will fail to account for the origin of the delusion. The supposition of fraud is the only possible solution, a fraud which must have succeeded in removing whole mountains of difficulties, such as I have enumerated in considering the theory of visions, and which it will be unnecessary again to refer to. The truth is, that this theory could never have been suggested by those who have propounded it, if they had considered that the problem before them was not simply to put forward a possible account of the origin of a belief in a resurrection, but one which would satisfy the conditions of history, and account for the erection of the Christian Church on the basis that its Founder rose again from the dead.

One possible theory remains; but its bare statement will be its sufficient refutation. It is this. The body was committed to the custody of His friends, and interred by them; but it was removed by His enemies without their knowledge. On entering the tomb, His friends to their surprise found it empty; and in their inability to account for what had become of it, they adopted the theory that He must have risen from the dead; and thereupon they proceeded to reconstruct the Church. Such a theory, in addition to impossibilities, which are peculiar to itself, has to encounter all those which I have brought before you in the course of the foregoing argument.

The preceding reasonings therefore establish the following conclusion. The assumption that Jesus Christ rose from the dead is the only one which will satisfy the historic facts. The account therefore which the Church has always given of its origin is the only true one – He has risen from the dead. His resurrection being thus established, the Gospels take their genuine place in history; the Synoptics as three reports of the actions and teaching of Jesus Christ, as they were reported by His followers, and composed within that interval of time during which such traditionary reminiscences must have preserved all their freshness; and the fourth Gospel, as an account of the same divine life derived from an independent source of information. This in an evidential point of view is all that we require. It establishes the truth of Christianity as a divine revelation. To determine anything beyond this does not belong to that branch of theology which is strictly evidential; and to encumber ourselves with the defence of unnecessary positions tends rather to weaken than to strengthen our defence.

Supplement I.

The appearance of Our Lord to St. Paul stands on a different basis from the appearances which I have discussed in the preceding Lecture. It will be therefore desirable to give a brief consideration to its evidential value.

The affirmation in the 15th chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians with respect to the interview with Our Lord on the road to Damascus puts it on a par with the appearances to the original disciples, affords decisive proof that Paul was fully convinced of its objective reality, “And last of all, He was seen of me also, as of one born out of due time.” The Epistles, however, furnish us with no information respecting the circumstances, which can only be learned from the Acts of the Apostles.

Two facts, however, they establish on the Apostle’s express testimony. First, that previously to his conversion, he had persecuted the Church of God and wasted it. Secondly, that after his conversion, he became its most laborious Missionary, and that the whole of his future life was one devoted act of self-sacrifice to the service of his Master.

The Acts of the Apostles furnish us with three accounts of the circumstances attending his conversion; one the direct account of the historian, and the remaining two in speeches purporting to have been uttered by St. Paul. Putting these accounts together, the facts are as follows:–

St. Paul left Jerusalem inspired with a deadly hatred against the followers of Jesus, and in possession of letters commendatory from the High Priest to the Synagogues at Damascus, for the purpose of raising a persecution against the Christians in that city, and, if possible, bringing them bound to Jerusalem. As Paul’s party approached the city, they found themselves surrounded by a light from heaven, “above the brightness of the sun.” This light was seen by Paul, and his companions, who thereupon prostrated themselves to the ground. In the midst of this light, Paul saw a glorious figure, who addressed him by name, and expostulated with him for persecuting Him, and who in answer to Paul’s inquiry who He was, declared that He was Jesus. Here occurs a slight variation between the narrative of the historian, and one of the Apostle’s own accounts of the same transaction, the former telling us that Paul’s companions “stood speechless, hearing a voice, but seeing no man,” while the latter states that his companions “saw the light, and were afraid, but they heard not the voice of Him that spake to him.” According to the second account of St. Paul a prolonged conversation took place between him and the person who thus appeared to him. The effect of the light on the Apostle was to strike him blind, so that he had to be led by the hand of his companions, and conducted to Damascus. During three days he continued without sight, after which he recovered it by a miraculous interposition, on which occasion something resembling scales fell from his eyes. He forthwith joined the Christian Church, and during the next twenty-five years devoted himself in an unceasing course of labour and suffering to the service of his Master.

Such are the facts. The utmost has been made of the slight variation in the accounts above referred to, as throwing suspicion on their historical accuracy; but the Greek is quite consistent with the fact that St. Paul’s companions heard the sound of a voice, but did not distinguish articulate words. Even if the unhistorical character of the Acts of the Apostles were granted, it is in the highest degree improbable that a forger, and especially one who has displayed such acuteness in his forgery, would have been betrayed into so palpable a contradiction as to have affirmed in the same work that Paul’s companions did, and did not hear the voice.

The following consideration fully establishes the historical character of the narrative given in the Acts. Whatever objections may be urged against the earlier chapters, the results of modern investigation have proved that no document which has been handed down from ancient times rests on a firmer historical foundation than the twenty-seventh chapter, which gives us the account of St. Paul’s voyage and shipwreck. No shadow of doubt can rest on the mind of anyone who studies this chapter, that the person who composed it was one of Paul’s companions. The perusal of the preceding chapters renders it no less certain that the author of them had accompanied the Apostle in his Missionary travels during several years. This fact is alone sufficient to establish the authenticity of the account. It is incredible that a person who had been Paul’s companion for a considerable period, did not receive from him some account of the event to which he attributed his conversion; and which had changed him from a persecutor into the most devoted Missionary of the Christian cause. This being so, it follows that the threefold account as we read it in the Acts, relates the circumstances of St. Paul’s conversion as he himself believed in them.

Such then are the facts to be accounted for. Only two theories respecting them are possible. Either the facts were objective realities; or the Apostle was labouring under some species of mental hallucination.

Even unbelievers must admit that the former, if true, is a philosophical account of the facts and of the results which followed them. The question therefore arises, Can any theory of visions afford an adequate solution of them?

The following is the most plausible explanation which unbelief has propounded of the conversion of St. Paul on the supposition that the appearance of Jesus was due to mental hallucination. The Apostle was a man of that exalted and enthusiastic temperament which leads those subject to it to confound the subjective and the objective. This is said to be proved, not only by the whole tenour of his writings, but by the fact that after his conversion, he was in the habit of seeing visions, and falling into trances. This state of mind, acting on the beliefs in which he had been educated, made him an uncompromising opponent of Christianity, and led him to take a very active part in the murder of Stephen. The demeanour of the Martyr however had profoundly impressed him; and the whole scene continued to haunt his imagination. In this divided state of mind, yet with his former hatred of Jesus still in the ascendant, he started for Damascus with the commission from the Jewish priests. His journey gave him ample time for meditation. The image of the murdered Stephen, and the work of persecution on which he was about to enter, produced in him a feeling of deep distraction. As he approached Damascus, a natural phenomenon, such as a thunderstorm, and a flash of lightning occurred. Paul, already in a state approaching frenzy, fell to the earth in terror. His excited imagination created the image of Jesus himself, and made him fancy that he heard his voice saying, “Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me,” the voice which he heard being nothing but the echo of his thoroughly aroused conscience. Further meditation led him to join the Christian Church, and the same temperament which had hitherto made him its most active persecutor, converted him into its most energetic Missionary.

The theory of visions in this case is free from several of the difficulties with which it is beset when offered as a rational account of the appearances to the original followers of Jesus. In the latter case it was necessary to assume that bodies of disciples, when assembled together; saw visions which they mistook for realities. In the case of Paul the statement of the historian is express, that he alone saw Our Lord, and heard His voice, and that his companions saw only the light, and heard a sound: but that they heard no articulate words. The further difficulty in the case of the disciples, that they must have mistaken visionary conversations containing directions for the reconstruction of the Church, for realities, applies with less force in the case of the Apostle, who only believed that he received a direction in a single interview, to preach the Gospel to the Gentiles. In addition to this, the idea of the resurrection of Jesus, and his exaltation to mighty power in the kingdom of God, was now no longer a novelty; and the investigations of Paul the persecutor must have fully disclosed that such was the belief of the Christian Church.

On the other hand, St. Paul’s case is encumbered with peculiar difficulties of its own. While acting as a persecutor, it is simply incredible that he did not sift the whole matter to the bottom. He must have been familiar with the account which was given by the disciples of Jesus. He must have been thoroughly acquainted with the theory propounded on the subject by the Jewish priests. As a member of the Cilician Synagogue, which disputed with Stephen, he must have urged all his objections against the arguments of the Protomartyr. Let us suppose that his reasonings broke down. Yet he was still unconvinced; and remained a furious persecutor. He must therefore have been under the influence of the strongest prepossession and fixed idea, and wholly devoid of expectancy. Consequently, his state of mind must have been altogether incompatible with seeing a vision of Jesus risen from the dead, and mistaking it for a reality.

The idea that the demeanour of Stephen had produced any powerful impression on him is not only a bare assumption, without one single atom of evidence to support it, but is contrary to his own express affirmations. Conscience had not remonstrated with him up to the time of the journey to Damascus. “I have lived,” he says, addressing the Jewish Council, “in all good conscience towards God until this day.” Not a single hint that he was in any sense a conscience-stricken man, or that he was in a relenting mood, occurs in any of his Epistles. On the contrary, to the Galatians he writes: “Ye have heard of my conversation in times past in the Jews’ religion, how that beyond measure I persecuted the Church of God, and wasted it; and profited in the Jews’ religion above many my equals in mine own nation, being more exceedingly zealous for the traditions of my fathers. But when it pleased God, who separated me from my mother’s womb, and called me by his grace, to reveal his Son in me, that I might preach him among the heathen; immediately I conferred not with flesh and blood.” Equally decisive is the address to King Agrippa, “Many of the saints did I shut up in prison, having received authority from the chief priests; and when they were put to death, I gave my voice against them. And I punished them oft in every synagogue, and compelled them to blaspheme; and being exceedingly mad against them, I persecuted them even unto strange cities. Whereupon as I went to Damascus with authority and commission from the chief priests,” &c.

If the Apostle has correctly described his feelings in either of these passages, and the second of them is beyond all dispute written by himself, they utterly negative the idea of his being in such a disturbed state of mind at the time of the journey as could have produced the visionary appearance.

If it was simply imaginary, it can be accounted for on no principle known to mental science. The Apostle tells us that at the time of the journey, he was under the strongest influence of those kinds of prepossession and fixed idea which would have produced a precisely contrary result. “I was exceedingly zealous,” says he, “for the traditions of my fathers.” “Being exceedingly mad against them, I persecuted them even unto strange cities.” His prepossessions and fixed ideas were therefore those of extreme Judaism and narrow-minded bigotry. If such a state of mind could generate visions at all, they must assuredly have been of a character precisely opposite to those which St. Paul imagined that he saw. Even if they could have suggested to him the appearance of the risen Jesus (which is impossible), we should never have heard one word about preaching Christianity to the Gentiles.

The thunderstorm and the lightning-flash are not only a mere guess on the part of those who have suggested them, but are directly contrary to the evidence we possess. Neither narrative says one word about darkness. The time of the appearance is definitely stated to have been at noonday, and it is implied that the sun was shining. Under such circumstances no flash of lightning could have exceeded the sun in brightness, and the brightness was seen by the Apostle’s companions as well as by himself. The hypothesis of an attack of sunstroke would be far more probable under the circumstances than a flash of lightning; but even if assumptions wholly devoid of foundation can be admitted as accounting for one of the most important events in history, no principle then operating in the Apostle’s mind could have produced the results with which the vision was attended, viz., a complete revolution in his ideas, and a self-devotion to an entirely new course of action, which ended only with his life.

One little circumstance mentioned by the historian is utterly incompatible with any theory that the appearance on the road to Damascus was only a subjective vision. When Paul recovered his sight, we are told that there fell from his eyes “as it had been scales.” This fact, if true (and it seems impossible to ascribe it to the inventive powers of the historian), points to an objective reality of some kind. Any theory of visions, therefore, is simply worthless until it can explain how it was that Paul was stricken with blindness, and that three days after, when he recovered his sight, scales fell from his eyes. It will hardly be urged that the scales were visionary ones, or that they could have resulted from the action of Paul’s mind on his body.

So far are the contents of the Epistles from justifying the observation that St. Paul was a man of such a mental temperament as to have led him to confound between the subjective and the objective, that they point to a conclusion directly opposite. As I have observed in the sixth Lecture, if he had been a man of this temperament, the discussion respecting the supernatural gifts must have afforded ample opportunity for its display. Yet during the whole discussion we find nothing but the soundest reason and the acutest mental discrimination. As I have observed, the calm judgment exhibited by the Apostle throughout the entire discussion utterly negatives the hypothesis in question.

The Epistles unquestionably affirm that he had truth communicated to his mind by revelation. But to erect on this fact the theory that he was a man of that peculiar temperament which leads to the confounding of the subjective and the objective is to assume the point at issue. On the contrary, the Epistles abound with examples of his discriminating between the workings of his own mind and the divine illumination with which he believed himself to have been favoured; and they do not furnish us with a single instance in which the two are confounded together. The distinction between the affirmations of Paul in his human character – even those which he made, as one who had “obtained mercy of the Lord to be faithful,” and “believing that he had the Spirit of God,” is everywhere clearly marked off from that knowledge which he believed to have been imparted to him by express revelation.

The following is the only apparent instance to the contrary, which will therefore require a brief consideration. The Apostle writes, “It is not expedient for me doubtless to glory. I will come to visions and revelations of the Lord. I knew a man in Christ about fourteen years ago (whether in the body, I cannot tell; or whether out of the body, I cannot tell: God knoweth); such an one caught up to the third heaven. And I knew such a man (whether in the body, or out of the body, I cannot tell: God knoweth;) How that he was caught up into paradise, and heard unspeakable words, which it is not lawful (εξον, possible) for a man to utter. ... And lest I should be exalted above measure through the abundance of the revelations,” &c. (2 Cor. 12:1–7.)

This passage is remarkable, and clearly establishes the following facts:–

First: that St. Paul somewhere near the time of his conversion believed himself to have been favoured with a preternatural illumination respecting divine truth.

Secondly: that this illumination was imparted by means of visions.

Thirdly: that in the particular vision in question, his own consciousness was unable to determine whether he was “in the body or out of it.”

Fourthly: that as far as consciousness was concerned, he seemed to be translated out of this world into a higher sphere.

So far then is this passage from justifying the idea that he was in the habit of confounding the subjective and the objective, that it proves that on ordinary occasions he carefully discriminated between them. He tells us twice over, that on this particular occasion he could not tell for certain whether he was in the body or out of it. He was fully aware that it was a vision, but whether it was attended with a local transportation of his personality, he was ignorant. The twofold affirmation therefore of his ignorance on this particular occasion proves that he was in the habit of exercising a careful discrimination between his visions and the creations of his own mind; and consequently that his mental character was the opposite of that which the propounders of the theory, that the appearance of Our Lord on the road to Damascus was a creation of his own disordered imagination, are compelled to assume.

The other visions mentioned by St. Luke in the Acts of the Apostles, such as the trance in the temple, the vision of the man of Macedonia, the subsequent vision of Our Lord after St. Paul’s arrest, and the appearance of the angel during his voyage to Rome, are of a precisely similar character; and instead of affording the smallest countenance to the opinion that he could not discriminate on these occasions between the subjective and the objective, prove that he was constantly in the habit of doing so.

Let me briefly recapitulate.

Paul left Jerusalem for Damascus “breathing out threatenings and slaughter against the disciples of the Lord,” “being exceedingly mad against them,” “exceedingly zealous for the traditions of his fathers.” Such a state of mind both philosophy and science teach us to be the direct opposite to that which would have been necessary for seeing a vision of Jesus and mistaking it for a reality, even if we assume, contrary to the conditions of the history, that the Apostle encountered a thunderstorm on the way. The Apostle and his companions believed themselves to have been encompassed suddenly by a light brighter than the sun. They fall to the earth. Paul beholds a divine appearance, which addresses him by name; expostulates with him for persecuting Him; affirms that He is Jesus, and informs him that he shall be instructed in what His pleasure is, after he has entered the city. The appearance deprives the Apostle of his eyesight. Three days he continues in Damascus in profound meditation, after which he openly joins the Christian Church, on which occasion he recovers his sight by the visible falling of scales from his eyes. From this day forth to the end of his life, St. Paul became the most zealous of Christian Missionaries. That Jesus, who had been the object of his deepest hatred, became the object of his most ardent love. His narrow-mindedness and zeal for the traditions of his fathers, was changed into the most Catholic Christianity and a readiness to encounter every danger in its propagation. The subsequent life of the persecutor was one continued act of self-devotion to the cause of the persecuted, despite of all dangers and sufferings. Such are the facts. Let philosophy or science, if it can, afford any rational account of them on the supposition that they were the result of mental hallucination.

Supplement II.

The following are Dr. Carpenter’s positions as stated at the conclusion of his article on “the Fallacies of Testimony”:–

“Now I fail to see what stronger external evidence there is of any of the supernatural occurrences chronicled in the Old Testament, than that which is afforded by the assured conviction of this Jewish community as to what is taking place at the present time under their own eyes. And assuming, as I suppose most of us should be ready to do, that the testimony to these contemporary wonders would break down under the rigorous test of a searching examination, I ask whether we are not equally justified in the assumption that a similar scrutiny, if we had the power to apply it, would in like manner dispose of many of the narratives of old time, either as distortions of real occurrences, or as altogether legendary.

“In regard to the New Testament miracles generally, whilst failing to see in what respect the external testimony in their behalf is stronger than it is for the reality of the miracles attributed to St. Columba, I limit myself at present to the following questions:–

“First. Whether the ‘miracles of healing’ may not have had a foundation of reality in ‘natural’ agencies perfectly well known to such as have scientifically studied the action of the mind upon the body. In regard to one form of these supposed miracles – the casting out of devils – I suppose that I need not in these days adduce any argument to disprove the old notion of ‘demoniacal possession,’ in the face of the fact that the belief in such ‘possession’ in the case of lunatics, epileptics, &c., and the belief in the powers of ‘exorcists’ to get rid of it, is still as prevalent among Eastern nations as it was in the time of Christ. And I suppose, too, that since travellers have found that the Pool of Bethesda is fed by an intermittent spring, few now seriously believe in the occasional appearance of an ‘angel’ who moved its water; or in the cure of the first among the expectant sick who got himself placed in it, by any other agency than his ‘faith’ in the efficacy of the means. I simply claim the right to a more extended application of the same critical method.

“Secondly. Whether we have not a similar right to bring to bear on the study of the Gospel narratives, the same principles of criticism as guided the early Fathers in their construction of the Canon, with all the enlightenment which we derive from the subsequent history of Christianity, aided by that of other forms of religious belief. The early Christian Fathers were troubled with no doubts as to the reality of miracles in themselves; and they testified to the healing of the sick, the casting out of devils, and even the raising of the dead, as well-known facts of their own time. But they rejected some current narratives of the miraculous which they did not regard as adequately authenticated, and others as considering them puerile. Looking at it not only as our right, but as our duty, to bring the higher critical enlightenment of the present day to bear upon the study of the Gospel records, I ask whether both past and contemporary history do not afford such a body of evidence of a prevalent tendency to exaggeration and distortion, in the representation of actual occurrences in which ‘supernatural’ agencies are supposed to have been concerned, as entitles us, without attempting any detailed analysis, to believe that if we could know what really did happen it would often prove to be something very different from what is narrated.

“By such a general admission, we may remove the serious difficulties to which I alluded at the outset – difficulties which must, I think, have been present to the mind of Locke, when he recorded, in the Common-place Book published by Lord King, the remarkable aphorism that ‘the doctrine proves the miracles, rather than the miracles the doctrine.’” – Contemporary Review, Jan. 1876.

I should in justice to Dr. Carpenter quote a brief passage from the earlier portion of the article:–

“And, moreover, I observe it to be among those, in various religious denominations, who are converging to the conclusion that the ‘authority’ of Christianity most surely consists in the direct appeal it makes to the hearts and consciences of mankind, – who most fully recognize in the life, teaching, and death of Christ, that manifestation of the Divine (απαύγασμα της δόξης και χαρακτηρ της υποστάσεως αυτού) which constitutes him their Master and Lord, – and who most earnestly and constantly aim to fashion their own lives on the model of his, – that there is the greatest readiness to admit that the records of that life are tinged by the prepossessions, and subject to the inaccuracies, to which all human testimony is liable.”

“But the Scientific Theist who regards the so-called ‘Laws of Nature’ as nothing else than Man’s expressions of so much of the Divine Order as it lies within his power to discern, and who looks at the uninterruptedness of this order as the highest evidence of its original perfection, need find (as it seems to me) no abstract difficulty in the conception that the Author of Nature can, if He will, occasionally depart from it. And hence, as I deem it presumptuous to deny that there might be occasions which in His wisdom may require such departure, I am not conscious of any such scientific ‘prepossession’ against miracles as would prevent me from accepting them as facts, if trustworthy evidence of their reality could be adduced. The question with me, therefore, is simply: – ‘Have we any adequate historical ground for the belief that such departure has ever taken place?’”

It may fairly be assumed from this last passage, that although Dr. Carpenter holds the moral character of Jesus in the highest estimation, he does not accept His resurrection from the dead as a fact which is capable of proof. If he did, the question whether we have any historical ground for the belief that “such a departure” (viz. from that uniform reign of law which is commonly affirmed to be inconsistent with the idea of a miracle) has ever taken place, would be irrelevant. The author also seems to be of opinion, that there is no distinction between the Resurrection and the other miracles recorded in the New Testament, either as to the attestation on which it rests, or as regards its evidential value. Further: a miracle in his view is nothing but an extraordinary occurrence in the physical universe, which is brought about by the agency of forces of a wholly different kind from those at present in activity. Not one of his observations recognizes the possibility of moral miracles, such as I have referred to in the preceding Lectures. In a word, his views on the entire question are identical with those which were propounded in the evidential treatises of the last century and the beginning of the present. I draw attention to this, because such are the views generally propounded by scientific men when they attempt to deal with the question of the Christian miracles. They have probably been betrayed into this mode of handling the subject through the defective state of our evidential literature; but it is hardly too much to say that in so doing they have overlooked the real point at issue. It will therefore be my duty to offer a few observations on the mode in which the subject is here treated.

The question is argued as if the whole of the miracles recorded in the Old and New Testaments stood on a common level in point of attestation, and were of equal evidential value. This course has been so commonly adopted that it is impossible too energetically to protest against it. Nothing can be clearer than that one miracle recorded in the New Testament, the Resurrection of our blessed Lord, holds a position in point of attestation which is occupied by no other, and is also distinctly affirmed by the sacred writers to be the foundation on which the Christian Church is built. This being so, I ask, Why do not those who deny the truth of the miracles of the New Testament, confine themselves to this one great issue? To what purpose is it to endeavour to disprove the truth of the other miracles, or to explain them away, while this one is left standing? If it is true, it will sustain all the rest; if it is not true, all the others will fall with it.

Nothing can be more unphilosophical than the mode which is generally adopted by our opponents of dealing with the miracles in a mass, and attempting to account for those which rest on an inferior attestation instead of concentrating their efforts on the centre of the Christian position. Scientific men would be the first to protest against the application of such a method to any great subject of their investigations, and their complaint would be just. Let us suppose that a body of theologians were to attack the credibility of geology, and in doing so, to mix up all the theories which have been propounded by geologists, and affirm that the best authenticated rest on no better evidence than the weakest; and having demolished these latter, were then to raise a shout of triumph, and boast that they had demolished geology as a science. They would justly denounce this course as a convincing proof of the irrational conduct of theologians. Yet this bears a close resemblance to the mode in which the question of the miracles of the New Testament has been discussed. It is the very course which has been pursued by Dr. Carpenter. His first observations are directed to the miracles of the Old Testament. Having adduced the case of a body of fanatic Jews who at the present day are persuaded of the reality of some very grotesque miraculous performances, he observes that he fails to see that the miracles which are chronicled in the Old Testament rest on any stronger attestation than the convictions of this Jewish community.

I reply, first:

In discussing this question it is absurd to begin with the miracles of the Old Testament. We readily allow that the evidence on which they rest is far weaker than that for the miracles recorded in the New. In fact, our reason for believing in their reality is, not the evidence per se, but the general recognition which the writers of the New Testament give to the books of the Old. To treat the subject as though the evidence for the resurrection of the dead man who was thrown into Elisha’s grave was on a par with that of our blessed Lord, would be simply absurd, when the one was barren of result and the other forms the foundation on which the Christian Church has been erected, and the turning point in the history of the world. If Jesus Christ really rose from the dead, Christianity must be a divine revelation, even if we were unable to establish the historical credibility of a single miracle recorded in the Old Testament.

Secondly: the fallacy is commuted of placing all the miracles of the Old Testament on the same level in point of attestation. As among the New Testament miracles there is one which holds a place of special prominence – the Resurrection – so there is a series among those of the Old Testament, which hold a similar position, the great miracles of the Exodus. It is not my duty in this place to enter into a discussion of their historical credibility, but simply to draw attention to the fact, that in point of attestation they exceed that of every other miracle recorded in the Old Testament. They are directly connected with the historical life of the Jewish nation and the foundation of the Jewish Church. From that hour to this the Jewish nation has lived a life differing in character and intensity from that of every other nation. It is an unquestionable fact that some events connected with the Exodus created this nation. Their sojourn in Egypt is historical; their sojourn in the wilderness is historical; their conquest of Canaan is historical. Rightly or wrongly, the Jewish nation have always affirmed that these events, including the foundation of the Jewish Church, were in the closest way connected with the miracles of the Exodus, and they are in the closest manner united with them in the Jewish records. I fully admit that all this does not prove that they were actually performed; but in point of attestation it clearly places them in a very different position from some of the miracles performed by Elijah and Elisha.

The same observations are even more applicable to the miracles of the New Testament. Nothing can be more illogical than to treat them in a mass as though they all stood on the same level in point of attestation. Such a mode of dealing with the question would be in itself sufficiently unscientific; but it is greatly aggravated when the writers of the New Testament have especially selected one of those miracles, and affirmed that with its truth or falsehood their case stands or falls. “If,” says St. Paul, “Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain. Yea, and we are found false witnesses of God, because we have testified of God that He raised up Christ, whom He raised not up, if so be the dead rise not.”

It is therefore an entire misapprehension of the Christian position to call upon us to adduce direct proof for each miracle recorded in the New Testament. All that is necessary is to establish the truth of the Resurrection, and to show that the followers of Jesus, who must have witnessed the events of His ministry, reported that He performed a number of actions which must have involved the possession of a superhuman power. As I have said before, if He rose from the dead, it is far more probable that other miracles were performed by Him than that none were; and this one great miracle being established, the truth of the others requires no stronger attestation than the ordinary events of history, but may be accepted without the necessity of pointing out who were the witnesses of each particular one, or proving that they were competent judges as to its really miraculous character. Even if it could be proved that some have been incorrectly attributed to Him, or that they were wrought by calling into greater activity forces which under certain known conditions energize in man, it would leave the real point of the Christian argument untouched. Scientific men should clearly understand that the Christian position is not dependent on our ability to prove the truth of every miracle which is recorded in the Bible, but of the resurrection of Jesus Christ, and the manifestation by Him of a superhuman power exerted in the moral and spiritual world during eighteen centuries of history. To discuss the question on other principles is to raise a false issue.

It appears however that Dr. Carpenter has other objections against the Christian miracles than those which have been adduced by him in the Essay which I am considering. “I limit myself at present,” he says, “to the following questions.” Whether these other objections are stronger, or weaker, than those which he has adduced, we are left in ignorance; but the reader is allowed to remain under the impression that there is yet some formidable force held in reserve with which he is prepared to fall upon the Christian position. Such a force, even when existing only in the imagination, has produced a powerful influence on the decision of many a battle in actual warfare. All that we can do on the present occasion is to guard against the influence which any unknown force of reasoning which is held in reserve may exert in our imaginations, and to point out that that which is actually employed wholly fails to touch the Christian argument.

First: we are asked to solve the question “whether ‘the miracles of healing’ may not have had a foundation of reality in natural agencies perfectly well known to such as have scientifically studied the action of the mind upon the body?” The meaning of this question is made sufficiently clear by another passage (p. 292). After speaking of the effects which the mind when powerfully exerted can produce on our bodily frames, (for Dr. Carpenter is of opinion that even the marks of the stigmata affirmed to have been produced on certain Medieval Saints, have been produced in this manner,) he writes:

“In these and similar phenomena a strong conviction of the possession of the power on the part of the healer seems to be necessary for the excitement of the faith of those operated on; and the healer recognizes by a kind of intuition, the existence of that faith on the part of the patient. Do not several phrases in the Gospel narratives point to the same relations as existing between Jesus, and the sufferers who sought his aid? The cure is constantly attributed to the ‘faith’ of the patient, whilst on the other hand, we are told that ‘Jesus did not do many mighty works in his own country, because of their unbelief’ – the very condition which, if these mighty works had been performed by His own will alone, would have been supposed to call forth its exertion, but which is perfectly conformable to our own experience of the wonders of mesmerism, spiritualism, &c. So Paul is spoken of as ‘steadfastly beholding the cripple at Lystra, and seeing that he had faith to be healed.’”

The question here proposed for our solution, “whether the miracles of healing may not have had a foundation in natural agencies well known to such as have studied the action of the mind on the body” is altogether beside the point at issue. Such might have been the case without interfering with their miraculous character. There is no reason why in the performance of a miracle, Our Lord should not have made use of forces already existing in the universe, only so modifying and combining them, as to be a special manifestation of purpose; for it is this manifestation which constitutes the great distinction between an unusual occurrence and a miracle. Dr. Carpenter however has adopted the idea that to constitute an event a miracle, its occurrence must involve either a violation or a suspension of the laws of nature; and that it would be no longer a miracle if caused by the agency of forces already existing. He seems in short to think that to constitute an event a miracle it must be brought about by the agency of the divine will alone, without the intervention of any secondary causes. The inaccuracy of this idea I have already pointed out in a supplement to a former Lecture. As therefore it is quite conceivable that Our Lord’s miracles wrought in material nature, such as the turning of the water into wine, and the feeding of the five thousand, may have had a “foundation” in forces already existing, by combining and imparting to them a different direction, without involving any creative act, in the same manner He may have made use of forces energizing in man, for the purpose of effecting his miraculous cures. I do not say, that this was the real mode of their performance; but the mere possibility that it may have been so, is a sufficient answer to Dr. Carpenter’s objection. He that used a strong east wind as the intermediate agent for effecting the great miracle of the Exodus may also have wrought His miraculous cures by the combination and intensifying of forces already acting in man. The event would be none the less a miracle, provided it exceeded human power to summon them into activity, and to combine and direct them in such a manner as to realize the special purpose of His will.

But Dr. Carpenter goes considerably further, and observing that Our Lord and His Apostles generally required “faith” in the patient as a condition of the exercise of their miraculous powers, propounds a theory that their miracles may have been brought about in a manner similar to the wonders of mesmerism and spiritualism; and that the operator discovered the presence of a suitable amount of faith in the patient by a kind of intuition.

Here again the reasoning is singularly unfortunate, for unless the principle which he has laid down is capable of accounting for all the miracles recorded in the New Testament, it is valueless as affording an adequate account of the origin of any of them. Even if we admit that some of the cures could have been effected by exciting a powerful action on the nervous system, all the most important miracles lie outside its limits; but Dr. Carpenter falls into the fallacy to which I have already alluded of disposing of them all in a mass.

It will be unnecessary to discuss the truth of his position, as to the influence which a powerfully excited “faith,” call it by whatever name we please, whether prepossession, fixed idea, or expectancy, can exert on our bodily frames. It is doubtless startling to be informed that mental phenomena of this description can produce the stigmata; but on general points of physiology I am ready to accept Dr. Carpenter as an authority. There can be no doubt, that not only is “faith” the mightiest power in the moral and spiritual worlds, but it can also exert a powerful influence on man’s bodily structure. Of this we have all of us, in greater or less degree, had experience. But real as this power is, and although the precise limits within which it can be exerted are unknown, there are certain bounds which it cannot pass. I submit, therefore, the following reasons, which render it certain that Dr. Carpenter’s position leaves the Christian argument untouched.

First: whatever power faith may be capable of exerting, it is plain that it could not have effected the Resurrection of Our Lord; and that this event, if an actual occurrence, lay wholly beyond its limits. This being so, it is simply futile to propound the action of this principle, as accounting for any number of the miracles of the Gospels, while it leaves the greatest of them unexplained.

Secondly: there are several other miracles recorded in the Gospels, such as the instantaneous giving of sight to the blind, of hearing to the deaf, speech to the dumb, the cure of lepers by a word, and others, which the principle of faith in any known condition of its action, would have been utterly unable to effect. This being so, it is useless to propound this principle as a rational explanation of the miracles in the New Testament, while it is at best only capable of accounting for a limited number of them.

Thirdly: it by no means follows, even if the action of powerful faith was one of the intermediate instrumentalities through which the miracles of the New Testament were effected, that it nullifies their miraculous character. To affirm that it does so, is quietly to assume that God cannot work miracles through the agency of forces already existing in nature and in man. I must repeat it once more, that the particular force employed in its production does not constitute an event a miracle, but the combining of forces, be they what they may, and the imparting to them such a direction as to be a manifestation of purpose. Let us take as an illustration the case of the woman who for twelve years had suffered from an issue of blood, and whose case had baffled the skill of the physicians of the time. Our Lord tells her that her faith has saved her. If we admit that her faith wrought so powerfully on her bodily frame, that it effected her instant cure, will Dr. Carpenter affirm that there are any known cases of instantaneous cures effected by mesmerism? If not, the principle is worthless to invalidate the reality of even the miracle in question, still more that of the miracles of the New Testament in general.

The position which I take is this. The miracles wrought by Our Lord were the natural results of the divine which dwelt within Him, just as ordinary human actions are the natural results of the forces energizing in man. Neither the one nor the other necessarily involves an interruption of the order of nature. To take an illustration: If the more intelligent animals have any perception of such an order, a large number of human actions must appear to them violations of the only order which their limited. faculties enable them to conceive. At any rate, they must be to them utterly incomprehensible; nor can they have the smallest idea of the nature of the forces by which they are effected. Relatively to them therefore, they are miraculous. Yet we know that what man really does, when he performs such actions, is not to suspend or violate any natural law, but merely to give a particular direction to the existing forces of the universe, by means of his intelligent volition. In the same manner then, if our blessed Lord was really a superhuman Christ, actions which were the natural results of his superhuman working, would be miraculous to men, just as in accordance with the above illustration, many human actions must be to the highest intelligence of the inferior races. Such actions are in fact signs (σημεια); those which are peculiar to man, of the presence of human intelligence and power; those of the divine Christ, of divine intelligence and power. It follows, therefore, that even if Dr. Carpenter’s theory is correct, it is useless for the purpose of explaining away the miracles which the Gospels have attributed to Our Lord.

As the real nature of possession is a point which is still eagerly debated, it will be unnecessary for me to express an opinion of my own. I have fully considered the position taken by the writers of the New Testament on that subject in Chapters IX to XII of The Supernatural in the New Testament. I shall only observe that Dr. Carpenter is labouring under a misconception when he supposes that the question of possession has been finally disposed of, and that the belief in its objective reality is incapable of a rational defence. Before he can arrive at this conclusion, his philosophy must give us a rational solution of those terrible manifestations of the human mind, which a most intelligent and trustworthy witness has recently described as having come under his own observation among the devil-worshippers in India;* and of many other of its abnormal activities. As far as the present argument is concerned, it matters not whether the persons who were cured by Our Lord were demoniacs, maniacs, or both. In either case their cure, as described in the Gospels, would have been equally miraculous. Insanity is in many instances a complaint capable of cure by human means, under proper treatment. But the mode in which Our Lord cured demoniacs would be found utterly inefficacious in the hands of our physicians for the cure of lunacy. The successful application of their method is a sign (σημειον) of human skill; that of Our Lord, of the power of the divine Christ.

*See Contemporary Review, February 1876, “Demonolatry, Devil-dancing and Demoniacal Possession.”

With respect to the descent of the angel to trouble the waters at the Pool of Bethesda, I need only remark that the issue here raised is irrelevant to the point under discussion. He seems not to be aware that most recent editions of the Greek Testament, on the authority of the best manuscripts, reject the passage as a spurious addition to the Fourth Gospel.

I fully concur with Dr. Carpenter, that it is both our right and our duty to bring to bear on the Gospel narratives the same principles of criticism as guided the early fathers in their construction of the Canon, aided by all the enlightenment which we derive from the subsequent history of Christianity, and of other forms of religious belief. I would even add to what he considers necessary for the successful study of the question, and say, aided by all the light which we can derive from any quarter whatever. Those who have studied the Gospel narratives have long felt this to be both their right and their duty; and that it is so, is certainly no discovery of the author before me. But while we feel it to be a duty to bring to bear the whole enlightenment of modern times on this subject, we think that this can only be successfully done by the use of methods which are strictly logical, and in conformity with the principles of the inductive philosophy, not by the practice so generally adopted by a particular school of critical historians, of creating history out of their own subjective consciousness; nor by assuming that everything which is possible is probable; and that everything which is probable, so long as it corresponds to our own ideas of what things might to have been, is a certainty on which we may erect any amount of theories, however contradictory they may be to all the realities of life. This method has been very extensively employed by modern critics, and not unfrequently by the students of physical science, when they attempt to deal with questions which affect the inner life of Christianity. This is not to import modern enlightenment but modern darkness into the study of the subject; and instead of basing our beliefs on the firm foundation of scientific knowledge, to erect them on the sandy foundation of conjecture.

The following passage in the Essay before me is a dangerous approach to the use of some of these darkening processes in dealing with historical questions.

“I ask whether past and contemporary history do not afford such a body of evidence of a prevailing tendency to exaggeration and distortion in the representation of actual occurrences, in which ‘supernatural’ agencies are supposed to have been concerned, as entitles us, without attempting any detailed analysis, to believe that if we could know what really did happen, it would often prove to be something very different from what is narrated.”

In one sense, these last words are very like a truism; and we shall all of us unanimously agree with the author that “if we could know what really did happen, it would often prove to be something very different from what is narrated.” This is not only true of many miraculous narratives, but of not a few of the most ordinary events of life. This disposition to amplify and to misrepresent facts, and occasionally even to invent them, is unfortunately but too prevalent; but our duty in all such cases is carefully to sift out the truth; and not to take refuge in a universal Pyrrhonism.

The principle here laid down by Dr. Carpenter amounts to this: – “Because there has been a prevailing tendency to exaggeration and distortion in the representation of actual occurrences in which supernatural agencies are supposed to have been concerned”; therefore, “without attempting any detailed analysis of them,” we may deal with them in a mass, and arrive at the conclusion “that, if we knew what really did happen, it would often prove something very different from what is narrated.” He uses the word “often,” but it is evident that what he really had in his mind was not “often” but “always”; for if this were only often the case, the observation would be inapplicable to the point at issue; because the Gospel miracles, crowned as they are by the Resurrection of Our Lord, which rests, as we have seen, on the highest form of historical attestation, would have the strongest possible claim to stand among the excepted number. But this wholesale method of dealing with extensive classes of occurrences, which vary greatly in the attestation on which they rest, without any detailed analysis of the particulars, is alike unphilosophical and unhistorical. Whenever such processes are employed, they indicate the presence, not of calm philosophical inquiry, but of a foregone conclusion.

What would be said by our men of science if theologians had applied the same method four or five centuries ago to every fresh discovery as it occurred? I admit that unhappily there have been times when theologians employed the same methods as those adopted by Dr. Carpenter in respect to the miracles of the Gospels; and none are more stern in their denunciations of them than the writers in question. Let us suppose, for example, that when Columbus returned from the discovery of America, and related the wonders he had seen, he had been met by the following reasoning: “Does not past and contemporary history afford such a body of evidence of a prevalent tendency to exaggeration and distortion in the representation of actual occurrences of distant voyages and travels as entitles us, without any detailed analysis of the evidence, to believe that if we could know what really did happen, it would prove something very different from what you have told us?”

Of Dr. Carpenter’s work on “Mental Physiology” I wish to speak with the greatest respect. While I am far from accepting all his principles and conclusions, I have to thank him for his successful analysis of many of the abnormal phenomena of the human mind, and above all, for the devotion with which he, almost alone of scientific men, has attempted to investigate the nature of the phenomena of Spiritualism, that greatest of all the delusions of modern times. Whether he is right in all his explanations of these phenomena may be still open to dispute; but it is certainly high time that both religious and scientific men should investigate them to their foundation, when we consider that the belief in their objective reality has been accepted not only by the multitude, but by no inconsiderable number of cultivated minds. But on carefully considering the explanations which he has given of these phenomena, and of various other delusions of the past, I could not help feeling that some of them were capable of being used for the purpose of invalidating the evidence of Our Lord’s Resurrection, and that they were almost certain to produce this effect on those who have not made the whole subject a matter of careful inquiry. I by no means wish to imply that Dr. Carpenter, in propounding them, intended them to be used for this purpose. But the fact remains that they can be so used, and that ordinary readers are very likely so to use them. I have therefore felt it a duty to point out, as I have done in the foregoing Lecture, that even if they are the true solution of the phenomena in question, they have no real bearing on the attestation of that great miracle, on the objective reality of which the Christian Church is erected. With respect to his observations on miracles generally, Dr. Carpenter has only shared the fate of a large number of persons who have entered on the discussion of questions which lie outside their own special studies; and I cannot help thinking, despite his own belief to the contrary, that what he has written on the subject of miracles has been really due to the unconscious presence in him of that form of “prepossession” or “fixed idea” which is the “eidolon” of scientific men, that miracles are so highly improbable that to inquire into their evidence in any particular instance is a superfluous task; and it is greatly to be feared that no inconsiderable portion of this prepossession has been occasioned by his assuming the position which has been taken by many eminent theologians as true, that the idea of a miracle necessarily involves either a suspension or a violation of the laws of nature.

Lecture VIII – Popular Theories of Inspiration: Their

Relation to Scientific Theory

“That which I speak, I speak it not after the Lord, but as it were foolishly, in this confidence of boasting.” – 2 Cor. 11:17.

There is no one thing which at the present day is occasioning a greater amount of difficulty to a number of inquiring and deeply religious minds than some of the theories that have been propounded respecting the nature and extent of the inspiration under the influence of which the different books in the Bible have been composed. These theories have been identified in the popular mind, and by not a few students of science, with the truth of Christianity itself. I have been informed by Christian men who have devoted themselves to the study of physical science, that nothing so heavily presses on their faith as the persistency with which the truth of revelation has been identified with these theories of inspiration. On the other hand, it is certain that many of the sharpest attacks of unbelief derive their chief strength from the idea that Christianity is pledged to their truth. On one point I can speak with something like authority as to the effect which they produce on the unbelief of the working-classes of this country. I have during the last six years been present at discussions at which I have heard not less than one hundred addresses, made by unbelievers who belong to this class of society, on points which they consider to involve the truth of Christianity. Taking these objections as a whole, I feel convinced that at least two-thirds of them owe their entire plausibility to their identification of that particular form of inspiration, which is usually designated verbal or mechanical, with a divine Revelation. To this theory they believe Christianity to be pledged, and consequently that every objection which can be urged against the Old Testament on the ground that its statements or its language are not scientifically correct; or that its moral teaching is imperfect; or that it attributes to God the passions of humanity; or against the New Testament, on the ground that discrepancies exist in the Gospels which are difficult to reconcile; in a word, that everything in the Bible which is at variance with mechanical verbal accuracy is fatal to its claim to be considered a revelation from God.

Nor are these opinions confined to the classes in question, but with various modifications there is also among educated men a widespread belief that Christianity must answer with its life for our inability to reconcile every statement in Scripture with the discoveries of modern science; and not only so, but with the popularly accepted views of what Scripture affirms. The same thing is true with respect to its historical statements, even to the extent of maintaining the accuracy of the commonly accepted system of Chronology, and a vast number of other points which it is needless here to particularize. The same principle has been applied to the New Testament, and it is hardly too much to affirm that no inconsiderable number of the objections which are popularly urged against the truth of the Gospel narrative generally, are founded on the assumption that each of them must belong to that class of historical writings which rigidly follow the sequences of time and place; and that any deviation from this is fatal to their historical character. All this has been quietly assumed in the face of the fact that two of the Gospels affirm in definite language that they are not histories in the strict sense of that term, but memoirs, compiled for the purpose of teaching a religion; and the other two, if they do not assert this in express words, plainly imply it. On similar principles the demand is frequently made to defend the entire morality of the Old Testament, or to renounce our Christianity, as though it were inconceivable that God’s revelations can have been of a progressive character. In fact, turn where we will, we are confronted with similar objections, most of which owe their validity to the assumption that the truth of Christianity is dependent on our ability to show that all its facts and phenomena are consistent with the theory that the divine assistance which was imparted to the writers of the sacred books, must have been of such a character as to guard them from the possibility of error on all subjects alike, whether religious, philosophical, scientific, or historical; and that to concede the possibility of error on any one of these points, is to surrender the claims of Christianity to be accepted as a Revelation from God. From this has resulted, not only an extensive diffusion of actual unbelief, but (what is worthy of our deepest attention) a large number of religious men have been greatly shaken and disquieted in their faith.

This evil has been intensified by several of the efforts that have been made to counteract it. Many zealous but injudicious defenders of Christianity have propounded solutions of these difficulties of so inadequate a character, that they can be accepted by none but those who are pledged to the maintenance of a particular hypothesis.* The effect of solutions of this kind has been to create a great deal more unbelief than they have removed, producing as they do the impression on unbiassed minds that the defenders of Christianity are reduced to the utmost straits by the objections which have been urged.

*I adduce one of a very extreme character from a recently published work, as an illustration of the danger of such methods. Common sense for eighteen centuries has read the account of the Crucifixion as affirming that Our Lord was crucified between two robbers. A recent writer, whom it will be unnecessary to name, has made the notable discovery, that he was crucified between four. St. Luke designates the persons who were crucified with him as κακουργοι (malefactors); the other evangelists λησται (robbers). This writer therefore thinks it necessary to maintain that a κακουργος and a ληστης were crucified on each side of him. This is, I own, a very exaggerated instance, but it will serve my purpose of illustrating the mischief which has resulted from propounding inadequate solutions of difficulties, for the purpose of bolstering up a favourite theory. Unhappily such forced explanations have not been adopted only by persons who have to maintain a particular theory of Inspiration. We have a remarkable instance of one in Paley, who was quite free from prejudices of this description, in his attempt to solve the difficulty about Cyrenius and the taxing. No scholar at the present day will for a moment accept his translation of αύτη η απογραφη πρώτη εγένετο ηγεμονεύοντος της Συρίας Κυρηνίου; “This was the first assessment (or enrolment) of Cyrenius, Governor of Syria;” the words “Governor of Syria” being used after the name of Cyrenius as an addition or title, just in the same manner as an inaccurate modern writer might have said that a particular act was done by “Governor Hastings,” although in truth it had been done by him before he was advanced to the station from which he received the name of “Governor.” The simple fact is that the words ηγεμονεύοντος της Συρίας Κυρηνίου never could have borne the meaning which Paley has here ascribed to them. Whether St. Luke was right or wrong in his statement as to the fact, there is only one possible interpretation of his words, namely, “while Cyrenius was Governor of Syria.” Such forced explanations are far more dangerous than a candid admission of a difficulty.

I am deeply sensible of the responsibility attending any attempt to handle this question. I feel however that its importance is so great in reference to the present aspects both of scientific and popular thought, that to pass it over in silence would be an evasion of a plain duty. I by no means wish to affirm that all the difficulties which are agitating men’s minds at the present day, have originated in the supposed necessity of maintaining a particular theory of inspiration. Many of them are closely connected with questions of Theism, and in the higher regions of thought we are undoubtedly approaching a great crisis between the principles of Atheism and Pantheism on the one side, and those of Theism on the other. Yet it cannot be denied that no small number of them have arisen from the cause I have mentioned, and from that which is closely allied to it, the desire of maintaining the traditionary interpretations of certain passages in the Bible as the only admissible ones. This is unquestionably the case with many of the difficulties which have been suggested by modern science, of which no small number would disappear if the popular theories on this subject were abandoned for one which is strictly in conformity with the facts and phenomena of the Bible itself. If, for example, we assume that inspiration was not a general but a functional endowment, and consequently limited to subjects in which religion is directly involved, and that in those which stand outside it the writers of the different books in the Bible were left to the free use of their ordinary faculties, a large number of the objections which are popularly urged against Revelation from the standpoint of physical science and modern criticism would become simply nugatory.

I am aware that it has been urged that it is impossible to separate the religious element in the Bible from the various other subjects that are closely interwoven with it, and consequently that the accuracy of all must stand or fall together. So far, however, is it from being the fact that there is any real difficulty in the idea that God may have seen good to enlighten particular men on religious subjects and to leave them on others to their own unassisted powers, that it is strictly analogous to the mode in which He has communicated to us our ordinary knowledge, and therefore it affords a strong presumption that He has adopted the same course in communicating a Revelation. Thus not only has each man special mental powers which qualify him for grappling with particular subjects, and leave him on others in comparative ignorance; but the information conveyed to us by any one of our senses conveys to us no knowledge on subjects which belong to the special function of another. This is an unquestionable truth, although we are not always conscious of it in our actual experience, as, for example, in the case of vision. In the fully educated state of this faculty we judge of distance instinctively; though the power to do so is not any portion of our original sense of sight, but is derived from the combination of vision with the sense of touch. While in the present condition of our consciousness the two acts are undistinguishable, we know that the function of the eye itself is strictly limited to the perception of coloured objects; and that in the proper subject matter of the other senses it leaves us destitute of information.* In this respect then the idea of special functional enlightenment is analogous to the mode of the divine acting in nature; and the difficulties which it involves are precisely of the same kind as these which we experience as to the source of some of the perceptions of our senses. If therefore God has adopted the same mode of communicating supernatural and natural knowledge; and consequently, if inspiration did not confer a general enlightenment on every subject which came within the mental horizon of the inspired man, but only a functional one, we are at once freed from a host of difficulties which are at this moment grievously harassing no inconsiderable number of inquiring minds, and which form the armoury from which the weapons employed in the attack on Christianity are drawn.

*That the human eye only acquires the faculty of discriminating distance by means of a gradual education of the organ is proved not only by the fact that infants are apparently unable to discriminate distance until some time after birth, but also by the unquestionable fact that grown persons who have been blind from their birth and in after life obtained the use of their eyes, are at first devoid of all perception of distance, which they only gradually acquire by the aid of experience derived from the other senses. Yet in the fully educated state of the faculty the perception of distance is not only united with that of vision, but we are incapable in consciousness of separating the one from the other.

In considering the present aspect of the controversy between Science and Revelation, it is of the highest importance that we should discern clearly what constitutes the real source of our danger. It has arisen in no small degree from theologians under the influence of particular theories of inspiration having put in claims to occupy provinces of thought to which theology had no legitimate right. That this has been the case in past times is undeniable. The story of Galileo is a striking case in point. Theologians of his day were firmly persuaded that to assert that the earth moved round the sun, and not the sun round the earth, and the earth on its axis, was to contradict the Bible. We now know that what it really contradicted was not the Bible itself, but the Bible interpreted in accordance with a particular theory of inspiration. The result has been that theology has had to retreat from an untenable position. But to come nearer to our own times. Theologians did not take warning by this great disaster, and proceed to inquire whether the principles which led them into it rested on an adequate foundation, but clung as closely as possible to their former theories. The science of geology has come into existence almost in our day. Again was it affirmed that this new science contradicted the Bible; and consequently it was denounced as anti-Christian. Many of us can well remember when a great number of things which are now held as truths by most of those whom I am addressing, would have been denounced as of the most dangerous character. The positions once taken en this subject are sufficiently exemplified by the earliest editions of Hartwell Horne’s Introduction to the Study of the Bible, which some of us used almost as a textbook; and yet they were liberal compared with the popular views of their day. What has been the result? New ground has had to be occupied; old theories have had to be modified, and we have now arrived at the conclusion that the defence of the former positions was not vital to Christianity.

Nor are indications wanting that similar consequences are likely to ensue from other subjects of modern scientific investigation; to instance one of them – the antiquity of man. In using this term, I am not referring to his enormous antiquity as deduced from his supposed existence in the first stone age, or during the preglacial period; I allude to the evidences furnished by the early history of civilization, and by the science of language. It has been very generally held by theologians, that the Bible is pledged to a definite chronology; and that the supposition that the interval which separates us from the first man can exceed seven thousand years is inconsistent with its claim to be accepted as a divine revelation. So strong has been this conviction that to this hour no inconsiderable number of Bibles continue to be printed with this chronology in their margins, a practice which has led many people to view it as of equal authority with the sacred text. But the investigations which have recently been so successfully prosecuted in the early history of civilization, and the discoveries which have been made in the science of language, have gone a great way to show that this position will also prove as untenable as those which have already had to be abandoned; for the period which the received chronology lays down as separating the date of the building of Solomon’s temple from that of the Deluge seems inadequate to meet the demands that are made upon us by the growth of civilization and of language.

I by no means wish to imply that scientific men in their controversies with theologians have been always in the right. On the contrary it has recently been made painfully evident, that no inconsiderable number of them, when they pass beyond the special subjects of their studies, have propounded theories which rest on a very slender basis of fact, and endeavoured to impart to a number of crude speculations, the justly earned weight of their own scientific reputations.* Still it is an undeniable fact that science steadily advances; and that in so doing, it has compelled the abandonment of positions which were once held to be essential to the defence of Revelation; and it is no less clear that other similar positions are in considerable danger. It cannot be denied that the recurrence of retreats of this description is a thing which in the interests of religion is preeminently undesirable. It is not only fraught with danger but is exercising the most injurious influences at the present moment. Scientific men who are hostile to revealed religion are never wearied with taunting us with the abandonment of positions which theologians once declared to be essential to the Christian faith; and in consequence they venture to predict our ultimate expulsion from our own proper territories. What then is the plain duty of theologians under these circumstances? I answer, thoroughly to investigate the principles which have led to the occupation of positions which have thus proved to be untenable, and to abandon those which rest on no adequate foundation.

*We have a remarkable instance of this in Mr. Darwin’s work entitled The Descent of Man, in which he attempts to show how the moral nature of man may have been produced by a process of slow and gradual evolution out of the instincts of the lower animals. Great as are his attainments as a naturalist, this work shows clearly that he has not mastered even the elements of the science of man’s spiritual and moral nature. It is much to be regretted that so many scientific men, while they are loud in their denunciation of the dogmatism of theologians of past ages, imitate them in this worst aspect of their conduct in giving utterance to dogmatical assertions on subjects which lie outside the limits of their special investigations. Such dogmatism seems to be the original sin of the human intellect.

My first inquiry must therefore be directed to ascertain the cause of that warfare which is now raging between the believers in Revelation and the students of science. I am not now speaking of those forms of scientific thought which are essentially atheistic or pantheistic, for their opposition to Revelation rests upon principles which it is impossible for me to discuss in these Lectures; but of those which are consistent with the principles of theism. My remarks must be confined to those grounds of offence which have been given by believers in Revelation; for my space would wholly fail me if I were to attempt to discuss those which have been given by the students of science. I make this remark solely in order to guard against the supposition that I hold them blameless.

What then, is the cause, as far as theologians are concerned, of this unhappy and dangerous warfare which is now proving so trying to the religious faith of multitudes? To this question there can be only one answer. Theologians have claimed for theology departments of thought which form no legitimate portion of its domains, but which really belong to the students of science. This course they have been led to adopt under the influence of certain a priori theories respecting the nature and extent of inspiration, and to adopt modes of interpretation, the inevitable result of which has been to bring theology into collision with the progress of modern thought. My position is, that this mode of determining on mere abstract principles what inspiration must have been, and then assuming that it actually has been so, is a method which is utterly faulty; and is precisely identical with those methods of studying physical science which for so many ages rendered it barren of result. I contend that the only mode of arriving at any theory of inspiration which will rest en a foundation of reality, is not by assuming what inspiration must have been, but by inquiring what it actually has been; or in other words, by founding it on a rigid induction of the facts and phenomena of the Bible.

In taking this ground I shall at once proceed to shelter myself behind the authority of one whose name will be heard with reverence in this place, the greatest of all English theologians, Bishop Butler. The positions which have been laid down by him in Chapter III, Part II, of his Analogy seem to me to be quite adequate to meet all our wants at the present day. When we consider that a great portion of our present scientific and critical difficulties were unknown when he composed his great work, the principles which he has enunciated on this subject are a striking proof of his profound insight into the realities of things. It may be said of Butler, as St. Paul said of Luke: “His praise is in the Gospel in all the Churches,” yet it is surprising to what a degree his positions have been disregarded even by his professed disciples. If his warning voice had been heeded, we should have been spared much of that bitter contest in which theology has been involved with modern science. Yet by the eager defenders of popular theories of inspiration against the progress of scientific thought, the principles which were laid down more than a century ago by the greatest defender of Christianity, whose orthodoxy none have ever ventured to impeach, are not even referred to in this controversy; and they still persist in affirming to be vital to Christianity, what he has shown to be unessential to its defence. The words of the old Roman Satirist may be almost quoted here: “Virtus laudatur et alget.”

Stated generally, the position taken by Butler amounts to the denial of the validity of all theories of inspiration which are erected on merely a priori principles, and to the affirmation that the only firm foundation on which to erect any theory on this subject is the careful application of the principle of induction. But it will be desirable that I should briefly state his special positions. His text is subjoined in a note.*

*“Now if the natural and revealed dispensations of things are both from God, if they coincide with each other, and together make up one scheme of providence, our being incompetent judges of the one, must render it credible that we may be also incompetent judges of the other. Since upon experience the acknowledged constitution and course of nature is found to be greatly different from what before experience would have been expected, and such as men fancy there lie great objections against, this renders it beforehand highly credible, that they may find the revealed dispensation likewise, if they judge of it as they do of the constitution of nature, very different from expectations formed beforehand; and liable in appearance to great objections; objections against the scheme itself, and against the degrees and manners of the miraculous interpositions by which it was attested and carried on.... These observations, relating to the whole of Christianity, are applicable to inspiration in particular. As we are in no sort judges beforehand, by what laws or rules, in what degree, or by what means, it were to have been expected that God would naturally instruct us; so upon supposition of His affording us light and instruction by revelation, additional to what He has afforded us by reason or experience, we are in no sort judges by what methods, or in what proportion it were to be expected that this supernatural light and instruction would be afforded us. We know not beforehand what degree or kind of natural information it were to be expected that God would afford men, each by his own reason and experience; nor how far He would enable, and effectually dispose them to communicate it, whatever it should be, to each other; nor whether the evidence of it would be certain, highly probable, or doubtful; nor whether it would be given with equal clearness and conviction to all. Nor could we guess, on any good ground I mean, whether natural knowledge, or even the faculty itself by which we are capable of attaining it, reason, would be given us at once or gradually. In like manner we are wholly ignorant what degree of new knowledge it were to be expected God would give mankind by revelation, upon supposition of His affording one; or how far, or in what way He would interpose miraculously to qualify them to whom He should originally make the revelation, for communicating the knowledge given by it; and to secure their doing it to the age in which they should live, and to secure its being transmitted to posterity. We are equally ignorant whether the evidence of it would be certain, highly probable, or doubtful; or whether all that should have any instruction from it, and any degree of evidence of its truth, would have the same, or whether the scheme would be revealed at once, or gradually unfolded. Nay, we are not in any sort able to judge whether the revelation would have been committed to writing, or left to be handed down, and consequently corrupted by verbal tradition; and at length sunk under it, if mankind so pleased, and during such time as they are permitted, as they evidently are, to act as they will.

“But it may be said, that a revelation, in some of the above circumstances, one, for instance, which was not committed to writing, and thus secured against the danger of corruption, would not have answered its purpose. I ask, what purpose? It would not have answered all the purposes it has now answered; and in the same degree; but it would have answered others, or the same, in different degrees. And which of those were the purposes of God, and best fell in with His general government, we could not at all have determined beforehand. ... And thus we see that the only question concerning the truth of Christianity is, whether it is a real revelation; not whether it is attended with every circumstance which we should look for. And concerning the authority of Scripture, whether it is what it claims to be, not whether it be a book of such a sort, and so promulgated as weak men are apt to fancy a book containing a divine revelation should. And therefore neither obscurity, nor seeming inaccuracy of style, nor various readings, nor early disputes about the authors of particular parts, nor any other things of the like kind, though they had been much more considerable in degree than they are, could overthrow the authority of Scripture, unless the prophets, apostles, or Our Lord, had promised that the book containing the divine revelation should be secure from these things.”

1. As a priori principles are inadequate guides to the knowledge of the realities of the Universe; and as they lead us, when we yield ourselves to their guidance, to erroneous views of its actual constitution, so they must be equally invalid guides as to what must be the contents of a revelation, or the mode of its communication.

2. They afford us no reliable information respecting the amount of knowledge which God would be pleased to communicate in any given revelation, supposing that it has been His pleasure to impart one.

3. We are equally unable to determine what method He would employ in the communication of such knowledge; and by consequence we are ignorant of the nature and extent of the divine assistance which would be imparted to those who would be employed in its communication. Of only one thing we have a priori certainty, that if God gives a revelation, it will realize the divine purposes in giving one, but the precise nature of those purposes we can only learn from the contents of the revelation itself.

4. We have no means of determining in what degree or proportion supernatural illumination would be afforded; and consequently, our a priori; knowledge fails to enable us to determine to what extent an element of human frailty would be permitted to underlie the record of that revelation.

5. Equally invalid is our a priori knowledge to determine how far, or in what way, “God would interpose miraculously to qualify those to whom he should impart a revelation, for communicating the knowledge of it to others; or to insure their transmission of it to posterity.”

6. We are equally ignorant, if a revelation were communicated, whether the record of it would be committed to writing, or left to be handed down, and consequently, “corrupted by verbal tradition, and at length sink under it, if mankind so pleased.”

7. We are equally ignorant as to the degree in which “ obscurity, or inaccuracy of style, or various readings, or disputes about the authors of particular parts of it, or any other thing of the like kind,” would become mixed up with its contents; and consequently we have no right to assume that the presence of such things is inconsistent with the idea that the book which contains them, contains also the record of a divine revelation.

8. If it be objected, that the presence of such imperfections would be inconsistent with the purpose of God in communicating a revelation, the answer is, that we have no knowledge of what are the divine purposes, beyond the facts of a given revelation; and that such facts (be they what they may) are certain to be consistent with those purposes. Hence the only mode of forming any theory as to the nature and extent of the inspiration that guided the human authors of the Bible, must be by a careful investigation of its contents.

9. The only mode in which our knowledge of the contents of a revelation can receive enlargement is, by a careful study of its facts and phenomena, in precisely the same way as we acquire increased knowledge of the Universe; and there is no valid a priori objection against the possibility of such increase in knowledge.

Such are the principles which were laid down by this profound thinker more than a century ago, as to our inability to determine on mere abstract principles the extent of knowledge which would be communicated in a revelation, the degree of divine assistance which must be vouchsafed to those through whom it is communicated, or the extent to which an element of human imperfection would be allowed to enter into its record. These principles, if they are correct, and if they had been firmly adhered to, would have been sufficient to have guarded theologians, not only from the danger of taking many false positions, which they have since had to abandon, but are adequate to meet nearly all the difficulties which have been suggested by the progress of scientific and critical investigation. Would that theologians had taken their ground in conformity with his cautious foresight!

The want of attention which the principles thus laid down by the great defender of revealed religion receive at the present day is not a little remarkable. Eager combatants rush into the field in total disregard of them; and while there is scarcely a writer on any theological question who has not been proud to refer to the name of Butler, whenever it can be quoted in his favour, yet on this subject his principles, though bearing in the closest manner on the theological controversies of the present day, are simply ignored, while no one ventures openly to impugn them. But if they can be proved to be unsound, surely some voice ought to have been raised to warn the student of his danger. The time was when the writings of the great Bishop were profoundly studied in this university; and although controversies have since assumed an atheistic or pantheistic, rather than a theistic form, may the day be far off when they will cease to be subjects of deep interest to the student. Probably every Bishop on the Bench has during the present century recommended to candidates for holy orders the study of The Analogy; yet surely it would have been only right, in the case of a work which has been thus widely accepted by Christians of all denominations, either that positions of such importance should be fully accepted, or the inaccuracy of his reasonings, if such there be, pointed out. But neither has been done, and ardent disputants are rushing into the contest, and proclaiming that unless their own particular theories of inspiration are accepted, the truth of Christianity is imperilled. Need we wonder if scientific men have taken them at their word?

If Butler’s principles are correct (and I own that I cordially accept them), all our current theories of inspiration err in being based on a priori assumptions or on expressions found in particular books, as to the degree of divine assistance which was afforded to prophets and Apostles on special occasions, and applied to Scripture as a whole, instead of on a careful induction of the facts and phenomena of the Bible. A brief statement of their nature will make this plain.

1. The verbal and mechanical theories and their various modifications. I shall treat these two theories as one, because except as to some minute points of difference they are practically the same.

This theory, though now scarcely held by any theologian of note, embodies in some of its modifications most of the popular views on the subject. Of all the theories of inspiration this is the most thoroughgoing and consistent. Yet so completely is it at issue with the facts and phenomena of the Bible that few of its advocates venture to carry it out with logical consistency.* Its central idea is the denial of the presence of any human element in the Bible. The sacred writers were in fact the mere penmen of the Divine Spirit, and accordingly not only ought no trace of human imperfection to exist in the book, but its statements on every point, whether of philosophy, science, or history, must be infallibly correct. Such a theory, I need not say, exposes us at every point to the attacks of unbelief, and constitutes one of the most dangerous weapons which it brings to bear on the popular mind.

*There is one point at which the most rigid adherents of this theory hesitate to carry it out to its logical consequences. Yet it is evident that if it has any value at all, it is impossible to stop where they do. If the words of Scripture are throughout the dictation of the Divine Spirit, the style of its different books must be His style, and not that of their human authors. This would render it necessary to assume that their style is the most perfect and perspicuous possible; and that the sacred books, as they issued from their writers’ hands, must have been free alike from errors in grammar and orthography. If this was not the case, it would involve the admission of some human element of imperfection (it may be a very small one, but still it is a real one) into the sacred volume, the very idea, in fact, which this theory has been invented for the purpose of excluding. It is moreover essential to the validity of the theory that the style should be clear and perspicuous, for obscurity of style is not only a human imperfection but a very fruitful source of error. Here, however, the facts of the Bible are too palpable for the most thoroughgoing of systematizers. No one can pretend that it does not contain obscurities of expression; and in fact every one who reads its pages instinctively recognizes the modes of thought of its different authors. Those who hold this theory therefore shrink from carrying it out to its logical conclusion. In this respect Mahomet was more consistent. He held a theory of inspiration analogous to the verbal and mechanical one; and therefore he appeals to the perfection of his style as a proof of its divine origin, and challenges angels and men to produce its like. The whole theory is, however, so completely at variance with the facts and phenomena of the Bible as to constitute a striking proof of the length to which even intelligent men will go under the influence of a priori prepossessions. In fact, with the Gospels, the Acts of the Apostles, and the Pauline Epistles in our hands, it is simply marvellous that such a theory should ever have been propounded; and still more so, that it should have been so extensively accepted. It forms one of the many proofs of the eagerness with which men seek for an infallible guidance which God has denied them, instead of pursuing truth by the aid of those faculties which He has imparted to them. Thus one party hope to find such guidance by assuming the infallibility of a man; and the opposite party by assuming that of a book.

2. The dynamical theory. This theory is, I believe, held almost exclusively by professed theologians, being one difficult of comprehension to ordinary men. One of its chief objects is to recognize that human element in the Bible, the presence of which is too obvious to be denied. Yet it assumes that the human element is so completely interpenetrated by the divine, that the two become inseparably united.* It will be at once seen that this theory is of a purely a priori character, and it will be unnecessary to speak further of it here, as the influence which it exerts on present controversies is very inconsiderable.

*Some of those who hold the dynamical theory of inspiration have illustrated it by affirming that the divine and human elements are united in the Bible in the same manner as in the person of Jesus Christ. This illustration, however, throws no real light on the subject. As we are completely ignorant of the mode of this latter mystery, such a comparison is only an attempt to illustrate a dark subject by one still darker. It is not my duty, however, to discuss the merits of this theory, which is certainly far more moderate and rational than those which are popularly current, but to draw attention to the fact that although it has been formed for the purpose of finding room for that human element which beyond all contradiction exists in the pages of the Bible, yet in all other respects it rests on an a priori basis, and is not the result of the application of the principle of induction.

3. The theory of plenary inspiration. Not only is this theory also based on purely a priori principles, but its vagueness is its sufficient condemnation. It defines nothing. Plenary inspiration means full inspiration, but this leaves entirely open the question, What constitutes full inspiration? To answer this, we must ascertain what were the divine purposes in communicating it; and this, as Butler tells us, can be known on no a priori principle. To say that if God communicates supernatural assistance he will realize His own purposes in giving it, is little better than a platitude. The question is, what are those purposes? Are they to communicate all truth, or only religious truth? or how far, to use Butler’s language, is it the divine purpose to exclude from the record of Revelation every conceivable form of human imperfection? All these points must be determined before such an expression as “plenary inspiration” can have any definite meaning. The plain fact is, that every person who holds that the Scriptures have been given by inspiration from God in any sense whatever, must hold that the inspiration imparted to their authors must have been “plenary” in reference to the purposes of God in giving it. To use this term, therefore, as a designation of a particular form of inspiration can serve no other purpose than to hide from ourselves our own confusion of thought.*

*The following is Dean Alford’s account of plenary, as distinct from verbal inspiration, which he heartily rejected: “If I understand plenary inspiration rightly, I hold it to the utmost, as entirely consistent with the opinions expressed in this Section. The inspiration of the sacred writers I believe to have consisted in the fullness of the influence of the Holy Spirit, specially raising them to and enabling them for their work – in a manner which distinguishes them from all other writers in the world, and their work from all other works. The men were full of the Holy Ghost, – the books are the outpouring of that fullness through the men – the conservation of the treasure in earthen vessels. The treasure is ours in all its richness; but it is ours, as only it can be ours, in the imperfections of human speech, in the limitations of human thought, in the variety of incident, first to individual character and then to manifold transcription, and the lapse of ages.” (Alford, Prolegomena to the New Testament.) While agreeing with the author in many of his general conclusions, I cannot help thinking that this passage fully bears out the remarks which I have made in the text, as to the confusion of thought involved in this theory of inspiration; while professing to define it, it leaves us in the region of vagueness and uncertainty to such a degree, that it is only in a very qualified sense that it can be called a theory at all. Several of his previous reasonings on this subject are also vitiated by resting on an a priori basis.

4. The theory of superintendence. The object of this theory is to account for the fact, which is patent to every reader of the Bible who does not blind his eyes to palpable realities – the presence of a human element in its pages, but at the same time to guard it from the possibility of that error to which everything human is liable. To effect this purpose, a theory has been propounded which assumes that while the various writers made use of their ordinary faculties in the composition of the sacred books, such a controlling influence was exerted over them by the Divine Spirit, as to preserve them from the possibility of error, not only on points connected with religion, but on every other subject which came within their mental horizon. I say this because, unless it goes to this extent, the expression is equally vague with that of “plenary inspiration,” and really defines nothing; for unless the superintendence extended to the entire contents of the Bible, it would leave us utterly in the dark as to the limits within which it was exerted. The a priori character of this theory is at once manifest, for it makes no pretence of having been arrived at by an induction of the facts and phenomena of Scripture. On the other hand, every one who believes in inspiration at all, must likewise believe that a superintendence of some kind was exerted over the human authors of the Bible. But unless we lay down its nature and limitations, we determine nothing.

5. One more theory must be noticed; that which affirms that a special inspiration was vouchsafed to the authors while they were engaged in the composition of the various books, different from the ordinary inspiration, under the influence of which they acted and taught. We know as a matter of fact that apostles in their ordinary actions were not possessed of any infallible guidance. The author of the Acts of the Apostles tells us that Paul and Barnabas separated one from another because they could not agree about taking Mark as their companion; and Paul expressly informs us that serious doctrinal errors were legitimate deductions from the inconsistent conduct of Peter. Hence has arisen the supposed necessity for a theory which will discriminate between the ordinary inspiration of an apostle, and that which he possessed when composing a letter or a Gospel for the instruction of the Church. But not only does this theory contradict the express assertions of St. Paul, that his oral teaching was quite as authoritative as his written teaching (2 Thess. 2:16), but it is compelled to assume that if one of the converts had copied down an ordinary discourse delivered by an apostle, or an affirmation made by him on a religious subject in the course of common conversation, it would not have been equally inspired with a letter dictated by an amanuensis. Not only does such a theory rest solely on a priori assumption, but it contradicts the express assertions of the New Testament. The influence, however, of these latter theories on existing controversies is comparatively small. Most of them are only known to professed students of theology. But the “verbal” theory, with its various modifications, continues to exercise a very powerful influence on the public mind, and thereby exposes us to the sharpest attacks of scientific unbelief, and forms the chief stumbling block in the way of a large number of anxious inquirers.

I now proceed to examine the value of all theories of inspiration which are founded on a priori assumptions. My position is as follows. The abstract principles on which they are based, when applied to the facts of the universe, utterly break down as explanations of its realities. If they are carried out to their logical conclusions, they leave us in the presence of two alternatives, viz., the necessity of either denying or explaining away the facts, or of denying that the universe is the work of a creator who is all-powerful, all-wise, and all-good. Many eminent modern unbelievers have assumed the truth of these principles, and have arrived at this conclusion as the result. If we admit the premisses, the conclusion beyond doubt logically follows. A few illustrations of this mode of reasoning will suffice.

1. It has been laid down as a self-evident proposition, that if the universe be the work of a being who possesses infinite power, it ought to be free from every conceivable defect which unlimited power could have removed. But in the universe as it actually exists, there are unquestionable instances of imperfection. The inference has been therefore drawn, that if a God made the universe, his power must be limited. So far the conclusion legitimately follows from the premisses, and the only mode of breaking the force of the argument is to deny the reality of the assumption which lies at its foundation.

2. On similar principles it has been argued, that if a Being who is possessed of infinite power, and infinite wisdom has made the universe, it is impossible that he can have made the imperfect structures which are frequently found in the bodies of men and other animals. It is argued that such imperfection, if due to an intelligent creator, can only have resulted from some defect in his power or his wisdom. Yet the fact is unquestionable that such imperfections do exist.* The inference therefore is drawn, that if the universe is the work of a God, he must be one who in these respects is subject to limitations.

*Among the many striking illustrations of this is the unquestionable fact that parents not only transmit to their children particular diseases, of which lunacy and idiotcy are distressing examples, but even a tendency to particular vices.

3. On similar principles it has been inferred, that the being who has made the universe, if he is possessed of infinite power and wisdom, cannot be perfectly benevolent, for a being perfectly benevolent must will the perfect happiness of his creatures. Yet the existence of both physical suffering and moral evil is unquestionable. The attempt is therefore made to impale us on the horns of the following dilemma: – If the Creator is perfectly benevolent, then his wisdom or his power must be limited; or if these are without limits, he cannot be perfectly benevolent.

4. A similar inference has been drawn from the conception of perfect justice. It is unquestionable that the present moral order of the universe is not a perfect manifestation of this attribute. Hence it is inferred that the Being who has made it must be imperfect either in justice, in wisdom, or in power.

These conclusions are inevitable if we admit the truth of the premisses. Mr. Mill has urged them in his posthumous essays with an unsparing logic. The only mode of escaping from the inference which he draws is one which will be accepted by every theist, namely, by denying the validity of his assumption that the impress of perfection must of necessity be stamped on all the works of a perfect Creator.

From these reasonings I draw the following conclusion. It is impossible that the same a priori principles which are unsound when applied to the structure of the universe can be safe guides as to the nature and extent of the supernatural assistance which God must have vouchsafed in the communication of a Revelation. In each case an abstract theory has been laid down that God must act in this or that particular manner. In the one it is assumed that if a God of infinite power, wisdom and benevolence has made the universe, He was bound to realize our highest conception of those attributes in every portion of His creative work. This we know, as a matter of fact, that He has not done, and hence it has been inferred that if the evidence justifies our recognizing the existence of a God at all, it is only of one who is subject to limitations. On the other hand, it has been assumed that if a God, who is perfectly wise and veracious, has made a revelation, he was bound to exclude from its record every vestige of human imperfection, and to impress on every portion of its contents the stamp of infallibility.

At this point the two arguments, while continuing to rest on the same abstract principles, diverge in opposite directions. It is assumed that the Bible is such a revelation. On the principles above stated the inference is justly drawn, that no trace of error or imperfection can exist in any portion of its contents. This being so, the advocates of this theory are compelled to adopt one of the two following courses, either to deny the truth of every discovery in science, history, or criticism, which is at variance with the received opinions respecting the contents of Scripture; or to adopt some mode of interpretation which shall bring the Scriptures into harmony with the new facts. The adoption of the latter course is perfectly legitimate, except when theologians are compelled by the exigencies of their position to put interpretations on Scripture which are inconsistent with the obvious meaning of its writers. Still the principle is a correct one, for if the Universe and the Bible are both Revelations from the same God, it may fairly be assumed that fresh discoveries in the one would throw light on the meaning of the other. The only danger of it arises from the temptations to which it exposes theologians to put non-natural interpretations on the Bible.

Still however it is in the highest degree desirable that we should take our stand on principles which will save us from the danger of having to make any more retreats from untenable positions before the steady advance of scientific knowledge. The only sure mode of accomplishing this is to adopt the principle laid down by Butler, that all theories of inspiration, as far as they are based on a priori principles, are unsafe guides to the realities of things, and that the only way in which light can be thrown on this question is, not by laying down how God must have acted, but by inquiring how He has acted, and thus bending our theories of inspiration into conformity with the facts and phenomena of the Bible, and not the latter into conformity with our theories. By pursuing this course we shall be able to welcome truth from whatever quarter it may come.

Assuming therefore that the a priori principles above referred to are utterly invalid as guides to the realities of things, it follows that the only mode of throwing light on this difficult question is,

First, To ask the sacred writers whether they have made any such general assertions as to the nature of their own inspiration as would enable us to construct a theory which would be applicable to the entire Bible.

Secondly, In the absence of any such definite affirmations on their part to apply the principle of induction to its contents, in precisely the same manner as we do to any other subject of investigation, and to propound a theory which will cover the existing facts. Other road to truth on this subject there is none.

Such a method is in conformity both with common sense and with sound philosophy. Surely nothing is more absurd than on mere abstract principles to attribute to the writer of a Book of Scripture such a degree of divine assistance as he himself apparently disclaims. Let me take an illustration from St. Luke’s Gospel. If the verbal or mechanical theory, or any of its modifications, is correct, every word in this Gospel must be the dictation of the Divine Spirit. Yet in the preface the information as to the sources whence the author derived his materials is of a most definite character. He tells us that he instituted a careful investigation into the truth of the facts which he has narrated; and that while he was not an eyewitness of them himself, he has compiled his narrative from the testimony of those that were; and he adds that the purpose he had in view was that his readers might know the certainty of the things in which they had been instructed.* Yet notwithstanding these affirmations, the exigencies of theory have induced persons to affirm that the contents of this Gospel were dictated by the Divine Spirit. I fully admit that there is nothing in his assertions which is inconsistent with the idea that its author was possessed of one or more of the supernatural endowments referred to in the Pauline epistles, as extensively bestowed on the members of the Apostolic Church, and which may have aided him in his inquiries and imparted additional strength to his natural faculties; but it is plain that it can not have been of such a nature as to have superseded their use or rendered human sources of information unnecessary.

*Επειδήπερ πολλοι επεχείρησαν ανατάξασθαι διήγησιν περι των πεπληροφορημένων εν ημιν πραγμάτων, καθως παρέδοσαν ημιν οι απ’ αρχης αυτόπται και υπηρέται γενόμενοι του λόγου, έδοξεν καμοι, παρηκολουθηκότι άνωθεν πασιν ακριβως, καθεξης σοί γράψαι, κράτιστε Θεόφιλε ίνα επιγνως περι ων κατηχήθης λόγων την ασφάλειαν. – (Luke 1:1–4.)

It becomes therefore a matter of the greatest importance in reference to this inquiry to ascertain whether the Bible contains any such definite assertions as to the degree of the supernatural assistance afforded to its authors as will enable us to found on them a theory which will accurately define the extent of their inspiration. Such an inquiry may safely be confined to the New Testament, because it distinctly affirms that the enlightenment which was possessed by the apostles and prophets of the New Dispensation was greatly in excess of that possessed by the most enlightened men of the old. Now although the writers of the New Testament habitually cite the Old Testament as a divine book, and affirm that God spake in it on various definite occasions, yet not a single passage exists in it which lays down the degree of supernatural enlightenment possessed by its authors, or informs us how far a human element entered into its composition.* Several writers of the Old Testament also distinctly appeal to historical documents which have since perished as the authorities for their statements, in the same manner as St. Luke grounds his assertions on the testimony of eyewitnesses. Even if we understand the disputed passage in Timothy as asserting that “all scripture was given by inspiration from God,” this still leaves us in complete darkness as to the nature or extent of the divine influence.**

* It may be objected that the assertion is very common that the Holy Spirit spake in and by the prophets, as in such passages as “who by the mouth of thy servant David hath said” (Acts 4:25); and “Well spake the Holy Ghost by Esaias the prophet unto our fathers,” &c. (Acts 28:25); and many others. These passages unquestionably affirm that in each specified instance the prophets spake under a divine influence, yet they leave us without information as to its precise character or limits. Still less is it possible from such passages to construct a theory of inspiration which shall be applicable to the entire Bible. Besides, a great number of these passages leave us without any means of accurately judging whether in each case the prophet spake by special suggestion or from a general enlightenment pervading his mind, by which he was able to penetrate into the mind of God. Still further, such assertions leave us without any information on the point which is all-important in reference to modern controversies, viz., how far the divine influence conveyed an illumination on points which were only collateral to, and not of the essence of, the prophetic utterance. But whatever opinion we may form as to the extent of divine illumination which such passages attribute to the prophets on particular occasions, it is evident that to infer from them that the same illumination presided over the composition of every part of the Bible, including the whole of the historical books – Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Canticles – is to erect a pyramid of theory on an apex of fact. But still further, the quotations from the Old Testament which are made by the writers of the New have a very important bearing on the entire subject. They afford the strongest proof that they only attributed the general sense, and not the words in which it is conveyed, to the influence of the Divine Spirit. This is proved by the great freedom of quotation which is used in such references. The extent of this can only be fully estimated by an actual comparison of the cited passages with their originals in the Old Testament. If one thing connected with this subject is more certain than another, it is that the mode in which the Old Testament Scriptures are referred to and quoted in the New, is fatal to all theories of mechanical or verbal inspiration. Various theories have been propounded for the purpose of evading this difficulty, but all are destitute alike of foundation and of proof. I will only notice one of them, that which affirms that the passages as cited in the New Testament are the genuine utterances of the prophets of the Old, and that the variations from them in our present Old Testament are due to corruptions in the text. This is not only a bare assumption made for the express purpose of supporting a theory, but it creates far greater difficulties than it would solve. The following inference would be its logical result. If errors have crept into the text of the Old Testament to the extent which they must have done in the instances in question, it follows that an equal amount of error must be diffused over the entire volume, of which these quotations form but a small portion. The theory therefore, if true, would shake our confidence in the text of the Old Testament to its centre.

**Even if in accordance with the authorized version, we admit that in 2 Tim. 3:16 the word θεόπνευστος forms a portion of the predicate instead of the subject of the sentence, it leaves the question as to the mode and degree in which this divine influence acted altogether undetermined. Our version, however, has represented the Apostle as making a nearer approach to laying down a theory of inspiration than the Greek does, when it renders the word θεόπνευστος “given by inspiration from God.” But its only legitimate meaning is, “breathed into by God,” and this leaves the extent of the influence indeterminate. Thus we can only make it affirm what modern theories require, by first assuming that it does so. Not one word does it assert as to inspiration conferring a divine enlightenment on points of science, philosophy, history, or criticism; in fact, it implies that it did not extend to such subjects, for it affirms that Scripture is “profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness, that the man of God may be perfect, throughly furnished unto all good works.” As to its profitableness to their light on subjects of philosophy, science, history, or criticism, it is not only utterly silent, but by its silence implies that such points formed no legitimate portion of its subject matter, and it would be quite consistent with the presence of a fallible human element in the Bible in connection with all these and many other subjects.

The most important passages in the Now Testament bearing on this question are Our Lord’s promises made to His followers of such supernatural enlightenment as was necessary to qualify them for propagating His religion and founding His Church. That He promised them a supernatural assistance fully adequate to enable them to accomplish this work is expressly affirmed; but nowhere does He define its nature or extent. His three most definite promises are* –

*The following are the express promises of Our Lord: “But the Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my Name, he shall teach you all things, and bring all things to your remembrance, whatsoever I have said unto you.” (John 14:26.) “But when the Comforter is come, whom I will send unto you from the Father; even the Spirit of truth, who proccedeth from the Father, he shall testify of me: and ye also shall bear witness, because ye have been with me from the beginning.” – (John 15:26, 27.) “Howbeit when he, the Spirit of truth is come, he shall guide you into all truth εις την αλήθειαν πασαν, (all the truth, i.e., all the truth alluded to, not into every department of truth), for he shall not speak of himself, but whatsoever he shall hear, that shall he speak, and he shall shew you things to come. He shall glorify me, for he shall receive of mine, and shall shew it unto you.” – (John 16:13, 14.)

First. That the Divine “Spirit should guide them,” not into all truth generally, but into all the truth, which the context plainly limits to religious truth.

A second assures them that the Spirit should teach them all things, and refresh their memories as to His utterances.

A third that He would impart to them a knowledge of the future.

There is yet one more, but it has no bearing on the present question, that when they should be summoned to answer before the established tribunals, the Spirit would suggest to them the proper materials for their defence.

These constitute the whole of Our Lord’s promises on the subject, and it is evident that they are inadequate to form the basis of a general theory as to the nature or extent of that divine assistance which was afforded to the human authors of the Bible. All that we can affirm is that it was adequate to qualify His disciples for the work which He directed them to perform, but it is impossible to erect upon them a general theory of inspiration, or to determine how far an element of human imperfection would be permitted to enter into its record.

Nor do the assertions in the Epistles enable us to get beyond this. St. Paul has several times informed us that his knowledge of Christianity was communicated by direct revelation from Jesus Christ; but he nowhere defines the nature of that divine guidance under which he acted, or claims a general infallibility. Not a single passage can be adduced from his writings which implies that he considered himself more under the influence of the Spirit when he wrote his Epistles than he was in his ordinary teaching; but, on the contrary, they make it clear that he considered both to be of equal authority. Several passages also make it certain that he was capable of discriminating between those utterances which were due to divine enlightenment and those which were the result of his mere human judgment. Of these the passage which I have chosen for my text, with its entire context, forms a very remarkable example. Still the extent of the influence is left undetermined, and we have nothing else to guide us except his oft repeated assertion that his knowledge of Christianity was complete, and that it was communicated to him by revelation. But all this does not give us a hint that he considered himself possessed of a supernatural enlightenment on any subject which was merely collateral to Christianity, and in which Christian truth was not directly involved. On several points also the Apostle claims to speak with the full authority of Christ; but in some of these there seems to be a reference to Our Lord’s own personal teaching, which he evidently considered to be of a higher authority than his own.* It is also worthy of remark that any equivalent to the formula, “Thus saith the Lord,” with which the prophets of the Old Testament introduce their utterances, is only to be found on one or two occasions in the pages of the New.**

*Of this the following are examples: “And to the married, I command, yet not I, but the Lord, ‘Let not the wife depart from her husband,’ ... and ‘Let not the husband put away his wife.’ (1 Cor. 9:10, 11.) Here the Apostle is directly referring to the teaching of Jesus Christ; and he evidently places his own on an inferior level in point of authority. Again: “Now concerning virgins, I have no commandment of the Lord, yet I give my judgment as one that hath obtained mercy of the Lord to be faithful.” (1 Cor. 7:25.) Here again the distinction is drawn between his own Apostolical judgment and the express commands of Our Lord. The context shows that his own decision on the points in question was not intended to have the force of invariable law; but to be subject to modification in conformity with the peculiar circumstances and character of the individual. So again, after recommending abstinence from marriage under certain circumstances, he still enforces his judgment with hesitation, as though it might be influenced by the peculiarities of his own mental temperament, in the following words: “But she is happier if she so abide after my judgment; and I think also that I have the Spirit of God.” (1 Cor. 9:40): the Greek is δοκω. This is evidently the language of a man who considers that his judgment is entitled to the highest deference in consequence of the illumination of the Divine Spirit which he possessed; but who yet feels that he does not on such a subject speak with an infallible authority. This is strongly contrasted with the mode in which he speaks elsewhere in this same epistle. “If any man think himself to be a prophet or spiritual, let him acknowledge that the things that I write unto you are the commandments of the Lord.” (1 Cor. 14:37.)

**The habit which has so extensively prevailed, of designating the entire Bible, and even our own interpretations of it, as “the Word of God,” has no doubt greatly contributed to the diffusion of the popular views on the nature and extent of the supernatural guidance imparted to its writers. The very form of the expression conveys to ordinary minds the idea that every word in it is the dictation of the Divine Spirit. Hard language has been applied to those who have endeavoured by the use of a greater accuracy of expression, in saying that the Bible contains the Word of God, to bring about a greater accuracy of thought. Those who make use of the denunciations to which I allude, seem either to be ignorant of the fact, or to have forgotten it, that that great defender of the Christian faith, Bishop Butler, must be included among those whom they thus condemn. Throughout the chapter, to which I have so often referred, he carefully distinguishes between the book which contains the revelation and the revelation itself. Thus in the passage above quoted, he writes, “Unless the prophets, apostles, or Our Lord, had promised that the book containing the divine Revelation should be secure from these things.” It is hardly possible to overestimate the confusion of thought which has originated from this inaccurate use of language. To say that the Bible contains the Christian revelation is accurate; to say that it is the Christian revelation, the reverse. In like manner, to affirm that it contains the Word of God is accurate; but to affirm that it is the Word of God is misleading; for if every separate portion of it is so, not only must my text, with its entire context, which the Apostle affirms that he uttered, “not after the Lord, but as it were foolishly, in the confidence of boasting”; but such expressions as “the salutation by the hand of me, Paul; Remember my words,” and a large number of others, of a precisely similar import, which are evidently the utterances of the human Paul, be so. It should be observed, once for all, that the use of this expression is not justified by one single passage in the New Testament; for although its writers affirm that God spake by prophets, and generally in the Scriptures of the Old Testament, yet nowhere does it apply this designation to the entire Bible. I am aware that it will be replied, that it is very convenient to designate the Bible thus for popular purposes; and that the idea has become so fixed in the popular mind, that to do otherwise would shake the belief in its divine character. Its convenience I shall not dispute; but matters have come to that point, where questions of convenience must be sacrificed, when their result is to impress on the public mind theories of inspiration, which imperil the belief in Christianity. As to the plea that to use more accurate language would shake the faith of the people in Christianity, the first question to be determined is, Is it true? and if it be not, a saying of Our Lord has an intimate bearing on the point in hand, “Every plant which my heavenly Father hath not planted must be rooted up.” The charge of rationalism may be made with far greater justice against those who propound a priori theories out of their own subjective consciousness as to how the Bible must have been written, if it really contains a divine revelation, rather than against those who reverently inquire of its authors what was the nature and extent of that superhuman guidance under the influence of which they wrote.

The only portion of the New Testament which can be regarded as propounding a theory of inspiration is St. Paul’s description of the nature of the enlightenment which was conferred by “the Supernatural Gifts” and of the mode of their action. To these I have already alluded for a different purpose. As far as this description goes, it affirms in direct terms that the influence was not a general one, extending to every faculty of the mind, and conferring an absolute infallibility, but a limited and functional one. It establishes the following points as certain.

1. The supernatural gifts conferred a special enlightenment on a definite subject matter only.

2. That the enlightenment which was conferred by one gift conferred none on the special subject matter of another.

3. That the enlightenment was not general, but functional.

4. That the gift operated, when once conferred, according to the analogy of the ordinary faculties of the human mind.

5. That it was so completely functional, that the gift did not secure its possessor from the danger of abusing it.

6. That several of these gifts were occasionally united in one individual, in which case they conferred a more extended enlightenment; and that their object was to qualify their possessors for the discharge of certain offices in the Church.

7. Even the highest gifts did not convey a knowledge which was perfect.

The importance of the Apostle’s description of these gifts is very obvious. The conferring of them was the distinct fulfillment of Our Lord’s promises of supernatural guidance which he would afford to the apostles in the conduct of their mission. This is repeatedly affirmed in the pages of the New Testament.* Taking these gifts therefore as a whole, they must be considered as constituting the inspiration which was possessed by the Apostolic Church. Consequently the Apostle’s description of them constitutes the only theory of inspiration which can be found in the New Testament. As such, it stands in striking contrast to all those which have been laid down on a priori principles, and which have obtained so wide a currency in the Church. It follows therefore that as this constitutes the only direct light which the New Testament throws on the subject, any further information which we require can only be obtained, as Butler affirms, in the same way as we acquire it in all other subjects of human inquiry, by a careful and reverent exercise of those rational faculties which God has given us on the investigation of the facts and phenomena of the Bible.

*Not only is this rendered certain by the assertions in the earlier chapters of the Acts, but we have St. Paul’s repeated affirmation to the same effect, of which the following is an example: – “Wherefore when he ascended up on high, he led captivity captive, and gave gifts unto men. ... And he gave some apostles, and some prophets, and some evangelists, and some pastors and teachers, for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ.” (Ephes. 4:8, 11, 12.) Writing to the Corinthians, he says, “I thank my God always on your behalf, for the grace which is given you by Jesus Christ, that in every thing ye are enriched by him in all utterance, and in all knowledge; even as the testimony of Christ was confirmed in you; so that ye come behind in no gift, waiting for the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ.” – (1 Cor. 1:4–7.)

I now proceed to apply the principles which have been laid down by Butler to the solution of some of our chief scientific difficulties. The only thing which would render them inapplicable, would be some distinct affirmation in the New Testament bearing on the question. But as we have seen, the only thing which it contains resembling a theory of inspiration, instead of being opposed to the principles of Butler, is one which is strictly in conformity with them. The shortness of the space remaining at my command, compels me to confine my observations to a few of the most important points in dispute.

First: as to the difficulties suggested by Geology in connection with the first chapter of Genesis.

It will be no duty of mine to enter on the vexed question of the interpretation of this chapter. This has already been so thoroughly discussed, that it would hardly be possible to say anything fresh on the subject. One point may, at all events, be considered settled, viz., that the meaning which has been universally attributed to it until comparatively recent times, and which the exigencies of a particular theory of inspiration naturally suggested, is in direct opposition to the scientific facts. It is beyond question that the passage has produced a very general belief, that the entire created universe was brought into its present form in a period of six natural days. This is obviously the meaning which would be attached to it by a reader unacquainted with the facts of science. But it is no less certain, that when the passage is closely scrutinized, uninfluenced by any particular theory as to the nature of inspiration, it is capable of bearing, without offering any violence to it, a different interpretation. All modes of interpretation however, which endeavour to accommodate it to the scientific facts, are founded on the assumption that the narrative is couched in language which is not scientifically correct, but preeminently popular; and possibly, that the entire representation was seen in vision.

Adopting then one or more of the modern modes of interpretation which have been applied to it under the influence of the light of geological discoveries, how stands the case? Let it be observed that a great peculiarity attaches to this passage of scripture. Other narratives are founded on the testimony of eyewitnesses. This one cannot; for Creation, from the nature of the case, could have had no witness. There are only two alternatives as to its origin. Either the facts must have been made known by Revelation, or its statements must have been the result of a lucky guess of some one in the primitive ages of the world; for the idea that the knowledge could have been the result of scientific investigation in those times is out of the question.* The question then is a very important one, how do the statements in this chapter, when interpreted in accordance with modern critical methods, stand in relation to the unquestionable facts of geological science? The answer of even the most determined opponents of Revelation must be, that while in some minute points they are not absolutely consistent with the scientific facts, yet they make a marvellously near approach to them. This is the more remarkable when we compare it with the numerous cosmogonies of the ancient world. These, with one or two exceptions, are not only unspeakably grotesque, but bear no kind of resemblance to the facts disclosed by geological science.

*Some of the recent discoveries in connection with the pyramids may possibly suggest the idea of a lost scientific age. How far this may be true with respect to the mathematical and astronomical data in question, I would not venture to express an opinion, but that such knowledge could have extended to geological science there is not one particle of evidence.

One additional fact requires notice. I have no wish to express an opinion whether Creation may have been effected in conformity with any modern theory of evolution; but I ask attention to the singular fact, that there are two expressions in this chapter, which an evolutionist, who believes in theism, might accept as a popular exposition of his theory. The first of these occurs in the description of the creation of the marine animals; and the second, in that of the land animals. In both cases the creation is ascribed, not to an immediate, but to a mediate agency. Thus we read, “And God said, Let the waters bring forth abundantly, the moving creature that hath life, and fowl that may fly in the open firmament of heaven.” The next verse affirms that this actually took place; and adds that “the waters brought them forth abundantly.” In a similar manner the earth is commanded to produce the land animals. It cannot be denied, that as far as the language goes, it is quite consistent with such a theory of evolution as affirms that the Creator has acted through a principle of this kind as the intermediate agent in effecting his creative work.*

*It is not within my province in these Lectures to enter into discussions respecting questions of Theism. Still I cannot help expressing an opinion that the attempt which has been made in certain quarters to denounce all theories of evolution as essentially Atheistic or Pantheistic, is preeminently unwise. Theories of evolution which assume the possibility of creating the universe and its present order by the action of the blind forces of nature, without the intervention of an intelligent Creator immanent in and directing and controlling them, are undoubtedly of this character, and have imparted in the eyes of many a plausibility to atheistic and pantheistic theories of the origin of the universe of which they were previously destitute, and it is undeniable that this has been one of the results with which Mr. Darwin’s theories have been attended. But it is no necessary consequence of a theory of evolution that it should exclude the conception of an intelligent Creator. Rather, when such theories are closely scrutinized, they are found to be powerless to produce any result without one. As regards the Bible, it is beyond question that it teaches not only that God is distinct from and above the universe, but that He is immanent in it, and constantly energizing in its forces. This being so, there is no more difficulty in supposing that the Creator, after having given existence to the substance of the universe, has used some process of evolution as one of the means through which He has carried on His creative work than that He has called each separate species into existence by what is called direct and immediate creation. As to what immediate creation is, we are utterly ignorant, and our a priori knowledge entirely fails to determine the modus operandi in which God must have carried on His creative work. If the knowledge of this is ever attained, it will be, not by the abstract speculations of theologians, but by a careful study of the facts of the universe. One thing is certain upon any theory of creation, that in the production of each individual of a species, God acts in conformity with a principle of evolution, and not of direct creation, every individual man having been in this manner unquestionably produced from the first parents of the human family through a process, part of which is known to us, but the remainder is buried in impenetrable obscurity. Consequently, it is in the highest degree unwise to affirm that the idea that God has used a principle of evolution as one of the means through which He has effected his creative work, is essentially atheistic or pantheistic. One thing is certain. While this theory has obtained an extensive acceptance among scientific men, the data which are as yet in our possession are inadequate to justify a positive and dogmatical affirmation on the subject. Our duty is therefore to hold ourselves in a state of expectancy, free from all a priori theorizing, and ready to accept the truth from whatever quarter it may come. If we keep ourselves steadily in this position, we shall avoid the danger of having to beat any further retreats before the advance of scientific knowledge. In whatever way it may be ultimately proved that the universe has been constructed, it will never be discovered to have been built by the sole action of the blind forces of nature, without the interposition of an intelligent Creator. In speaking of theories of evolution, it should ever be kept in mind that there are many others besides the Darwinian in conformity with which the Creator may have partially energized in His creative work. Scriptural Theism unquestionably affirms that the forces of the universe are a constant manifestation of the energies of God. That theory which contemplates the universe as a self-acting machine which was once constructed by God, but the forces of which, when once brought into existence, continue their everlasting operations independently of His immanence in them, and grind out a succession of results with faultless precision, independently of His intelligent control, may be abstractedly consistent with Theism, but hardly with the Theism of the Bible, which contemplates God, not only as a perfect mechanist or chemist, which this theory represents Him to be, but as a Father.

Still, close as is the resemblance between the geological record and this chapter, thus interpreted, it must be candidly admitted that the geological facts do not exactly correspond in all their minuter details with the events as they are here narrated. Are we then, in conformity with some a priori theory of inspiration, to put a strain upon the language of the chapter, which it will not bear, or deny the scientific facts; or, if we can do neither, abandon our belief in Christianity as a divine revelation? I reply, that there is a more rational alternative, viz., to apply Butler’s principles to the case before us.

First: the leading idea of the entire chapter is not a scientific but a religious one; its object being to affirm that the Universe is the work of one almighty and intelligent Creator. This being its obvious aim, it is strictly in conformity with the above principles, that the scientific arrangement being entirely subordinate to the main purpose, may have been accommodated to the religious one. Butler’s principles firmly establish the fact, that we have no a priori certainty that a revelation, whose one great object is the communication of religious truth, must be minutely accurate on points of scientific knowledge in the record which contains it, on pain of forfeiting its character as a revelation from God.

Secondly: the narrative nowhere affirms that its contents were communicated by immediate revelation to the author of the Book of Genesis. There is nothing whatever to imply that it was not in existence long prior to his time, or that the writer did not find it already in existence, and incorporate it into his work. He is in fact very particular in informing us what parts of the Pentateuch were communicated to him by special revelation; but he gives us no hint whatever that he derived his knowledge of any part of the book of Genesis in this way. As, however, it is certain that the contents of this chapter, unless they were the results of a lucky guess, must have been the subject of some primitive revelation, it follows that during some period the vehicle of its transmission must have been a traditionary one. A careful perusal of the different ancient cosmogonies proves that they possess many points in common, and therefore renders it highly probable that they are as many different versions of some primeval account, of which the grotesque elements are subsequent interpolations, which they have undergone in the course of oral transmission.* Here then we may invoke Butler’s principle, that we have no a priori certainty that God would interfere to prevent the account from undergoing some degree of corruption in the course of such transmission; and consequently, that this may have been the source of its minuter divergencies from the strict accuracy of scientific facts. If this be so, it follows on the same principles, that we are unable to affirm that a supernatural enlightenment must have been imparted to the author of the book of Genesis, to enable him to correct them. The principle therefore which has been adopted by numerous defenders of Christianity, of representing that its truth must stand or fall with our ability to reconcile every statement of this chapter with the minutest accuracy of scientific facts, cannot be too strongly reprobated. If the writer had expressly affirmed that he had received every word in the chapter by immediate revelation from God; and that such revelation was intended to be scientifically correct, the presence of errors in his narrative would have been inconsistent with his pretensions. But as Butler has well observed, the presence of errors of this kind would only invalidate a revelation if the record of it contained a definite promise that it should be exempt from there.

*This is strongly confirmed by the discovery of the genuine Chaldean cosmogony by the late Mr. G. Smith. Its close resemblance to that in Genesis is unmistakable, the latter being the monotheistic account of Creation, and the former being the same account exhibited in a polytheistic dress.

Secondly: as to the antiquity of Man. According to the popularly accepted theories of inspiration, the Scriptures are considered to be pledged to a system of Chronology which affirms that the creation of man cannot be separated from the present time by an interval of more than about seven thousand years, and the Flood by more than about five thousand; and that any alleged discoveries of science which prove that man has existed on the earth for a longer period are inconsistent with the claims of the Bible to contain a divine Revelation.*

*Thus the question has been eagerly debated as to the exact time of the Israelites sojourn in Egypt, or whether the interval of 450 years which St. Paul assigns in his address to the Jews in the synagogue at Antioch in Pisidia, is correct, as though the life of Christianity depended on the issue. As we have seen, we have neither a priori nor a posteriori knowledge that an apostle must have received supernatural illumination on the subject of Chronology. Why might not St. Paul have adopted that which he knew to be currently accepted by those whom he addressed? If he had done otherwise, he would have incurred the danger of diverting their attention from the all-important question of the Messiahship of Jesus to the discussion of his new and previously unheard-of Chronology. To determine the true Chronology of Scripture is in itself a study of great interest; but to do so as though the accuracy of every statement in it was vital to Christianity, is to place a needless stumbling block in the way of both believers and unbelievers.

I am not here alluding to the demands made by a particular School of Geologists for millions of years since the first appearance of man on this planet, but for a longer interval of time than that which according to the received system separates the deluge from the present day as rendered absolutely necessary by the evidence which has been adduced of the gradual growth of civilization and of language. The facts may be briefly stated. We are now in the possession of data which prove the existence of an advanced state of civilization at a very early period, say, between three and four thousand years before Christ. This civilization, as in the case of Egypt, is united with a very complicated system of theology. The proof is incontestable that neither of these came into existence spontaneously, but that both have been gradually developed. Whatever theory we may adopt as to whether man originated in a highly civilized or in a savage state, the evidence which has been adduced proves that the condition of things which the remains of antiquity discloses could only have grown up during a long interval of time, which must be added on to our earliest historic date. Thus, if man began as a savage, he must have elevated himself to that state of civilization which the earliest monuments of Egypt and other countries disclose, by a gradual growth which must have required a long interval of time. If, on the other hand, he began in a highly civilized condition, and was possessed of a pure theology, a very considerable period must have elapsed before the complicated, and in many respects, degraded Egyptian theology could have grown out of this. I select this merely as a single illustration of the large mass of evidence which is daily accumulating upon us.

These considerations acquire an increased force which is becoming irresistible by the investigations which have been made into the origin and growth of language. Not only is it certain that the Sanskrit, the Latin and the Greek, and several others originated out of a common language at a period of very remote antiquity, but this common language and all the other primitive languages have had a long history of their own, during which they have gradually diverged from some original and common stock. The evidence of all this, which is accumulating on us with a rapid pace, is incompatible with the popularly accepted theories about the date which must be assigned to the deluge, or even to the creation of man, on the supposed authority of the Scriptures of the Old Testament. Nor will the confusion of tongues at Babel free us from the difficulty, as the evidence is incontestable that after the formation of the original varieties these various languages have passed through a long period of gradual growths.

On the other hand, when we consider the data which they furnish for the construction of a system of chronology, it is evident that they are of an extremely meagre character, and have little or no value independently of a particular theory of inspiration. The date of the building of the Temple by Solomon is tolerably certain, but beyond this we get involved in obscurity and mists, which gradually thicken into intense darkness. Not only are the numbers subject to grave suspicion, but for a long interval the sole authority is a list of persons, who are said at a certain age to have begotten their sons, some of whose names bear every appearance of not being the designations of individuals but of nations. Still it cannot be denied that if it is necessary to accept the theories of inspiration of which I have been speaking, as vital to Christianity, the conclusion that a period of little more than 5000 years must separate us from the second beginning of the human race, and 7000 years from the first origin of man, logically follows from the premisses.*

*The absurdity of the popular theories of inspiration is exhibited in a striking light by the fact that each of the three copies of the Old Testament which we possess furnishes us with a different system of Chronology; and it is now impossible to ascertain for certain which was the one adopted by the author of the book of Genesis. They cannot be all true, and may be all false. This being so, nothing can be more unwise than to discuss this question as though the truth of Christianity was in any way dependent on the mode of its solution.

It cannot be denied that the present state of this controversy is causing anxiety to a large number of inquiring and deeply religious minds. Under the influence of current theories of inspiration, the opinion has been widely diffused that if the dates of the creation of man and of the deluge must be carried up several thousand years higher than those which have hitherto been commonly assigned to them, the position of Christianity as a divine revelation is seriously imperilled. On the other hand, opponents taking advantage of this state of thought, loudly proclaim that the disproof of the received system of Chronology is nothing short of time demolition of the claims of the Bible to be a record of a divine revelation.

What, then, is the remedy? I reply, the cordial acceptance of the principles laid down by Butler. These difficulties, and the unedifying discussions between theologians and men of science might have been avoided, if his warnings had been heeded, and theories of inspiration had not been propounded as vital to Christianity, whose sole ground of validity is that they correspond with the a priori conceptions of those who have invented them. The whole difficulty vanishes as soon as it is fairly recognized that we have no evidence whatever that the divine enlightenment which was imparted to the human authors of the Bible must have extended to questions of Chronology and other kindred subjects. The fact is certain that the author of St. Matthew’s Gospel has omitted three links in the genealogy of Jesus Christ, so that a person whom he designates as the son of another was in reality his great grandson.* If such an omission has taken place where we can verify it by a reference to the Book of Kings, it is impossible to be sure that protracted intervals of time may not have been omitted in the scanty materials which constitute the chronological basis of the Book of Genesis. The proper reply to all difficulties of this kind is that we have no certainty derived either from an a priori or an a posteriori source that the writers of the Bible possessed a superhuman guidance on subjects of this description; and our duty is not merely to hold such opinions secretly within our own bosoms, but openly to announce and act on them, in order that the many stumbling blocks which now endanger the faith of thousands may be removed out of their way.

*The three omitted names are Ahaziah, Joash, and Amaziah. Various reasons have been assigned for the omission, but these are utterly inconsistent with the theory of verbal inspiration or any of its modifications. This however is far from being the only difficulty connected with the genealogy. The fact of the omission is not removed by any possible explanation of its cause; and this renders it highly probable that in the genealogies of the Old Testament, especially in those of remote times, other omissions, and extending over far greater intervals of tine, may have taken place.

Thirdly: a similar course of reasoning may be applied to the numerous questions which have been so eagerly debated about the deluge and its alleged universality, as though the life of Christianity was involved in the issue. Here again, if a rigid a priori theory is assumed which requires absolute accuracy of expression in the record of Revelation, there can be no doubt that the Book of Genesis affirms its universality; and renders it necessary to assume the performance of a number of stupendous miracles by means of which the different animals of whose existence the narrative does not give us the smallest hint, were conveyed into the ark. In a similar manner it throws on Revelation the weight of a whole mass of difficulties connected with questions of physical science, under which the faith of multitudes has been made to stagger. We cannot wonder, when such principles have been laid down by popular writers on theology, if a large number of the students of science have taken them at their word, and boldly announced that their discoveries are inconsistent with the claims of Christianity to be accepted as a divine revelation. But if we apply to this subject the principles which were laid down by the great defender of Christianity more than a century ago, the difficulties in question cease to have any real existence. They may still remain subjects of profound interest; but whichever way they may ultimately be determined by the increase of our scientific knowledge, they will no longer be regarded as vital to the acceptance of Christianity as a divine revelation.

Fourthly: the same principle is applicable to a numerous class of critical questions as to the date and authorship of the sacred books. I by no means wish to deny the deep interest of many of these questions, or for one moment to deprecate their study, but only to correct the popular idea that the life of Christianity is involved in their solution. Thus we have had endless discussions about the Pentateuch, its authorship and date, and the number of documents out of which it has been composed.* Questions of this kind, which are involved in deep obscurity, and of which the evidence at best is small, seem to have a particular attractiveness to a numerous class of learned men. In many cases the uncertain character of the evidence is only surpassed by the boldness of the theories which have been erected on it. A late eminent writer, who holds it to be a composite work, has with the most astounding self-confidence boldly affirmed that he can discriminate the portions which have been derived from these different documents, and ascribe them to their respective authors. It is admitted however on all hands that considerable portions of the Pentateuch, if not written by Moses, are genuine representations of his teaching and institutions. This being so, I fall back on the position taken by Butler, as inherently sound, which lays down that, “Neither disputes about the authorship of different parts of the Bible, nor any other things of the like kind, though they had been much more considerable than they are, could overthrow the authority of Scripture unless the prophets, apostles, or Our Lord had promised that the book containing the divine revelation should be secure from these things.” If the principle thus enunciated by this great defender of Christianity is correct, it ought to have been accepted as their guide by all those who have engaged in modern controversies on these and kindred subjects.

*I may add that questions about the accuracy of the Biblical numbers, especially of those contained in the Pentateuch, are often eagerly debated as though the truth of Christianity was dependent on the result. I observe, in the first place, that nothing is more likely to get corrupted in transmission than numbers. Secondly, if Butler’s principles are correct, we have no a priori knowledge that supernatural enlightenment would be afforded on such subjects to those through whom a revelation was communicated. Thirdly, we have no promise of Christ that such knowledge should be imparted, nor is there any affirmation of prophet or apostle bearing on the subject. This being so, when theologians discuss the subject in the way to which I have referred, they not only place a false issue before unbelievers, but pursue a course which endangers the faith of believers.

Fifthly. My space will only allow me very briefly to apply the sane principle to the discrepancies which are alleged to exist in the Gospels. These have been magnified to an extent that is absurd. A large number of them admit of an easy reconciliation under the guidance of common sense. Others arise from the fragmentary nature of the narrative and our ignorance of the entire facts. Not a few of the remainder owe their origin to the fact that the events have been grouped in reference to the religious purpose of the author rather than in the order of strict historical sequence. Of a few the reconciliation is difficult. Of these the threefold account of the miracle at Jericho may be mentioned as an example, St. Matthew’s Gospel affirming that two blind men were cured, while it is the obvious meaning of St. Mark’s narrative that one only was cured at the entrance to the city, and of that of St. Luke, that a single blind man was cured by Our Lord after he had passed through the city. This difficulty is increased by the fact that words and actions so closely alike are attributed to Our Lord and to the blind men, that it is hardly possible to believe that they were repeated twice over in the manner in which they are given in St. Mark’s and St. Luke’s Gospels; and even this would leave the statement in St. Matthew unexplained, that two blind men were cured by Our Lord as He departed from Jericho. The attempted reconciliations of this discrepancy are all very forced and unnatural, and do far more mischief to the historical character of the Gospels than the candid admission of its reality. With respect to difficulties of this description (and they are very few*), the best solution will be found in the principle laid down by Butler, that it is impossible to affirm that if the contents of the Gospels were left to be handed down by tradition during the first thirty years of the existence of the Church, inaccuracies may not have been introduced in the process. A careful study of the parallel narratives will impress the student with the conviction that they have certainly passed through some period of oral transmission. To this all their phenomena point. It is therefore quite rational to affirm, if any of the alleged discrepancies are real, that this is the source in which they have originated, and that we have neither any a priori certainty, nor promise of Our Lord, nor assertion of His Apostles, that the writings of the New Testament must be free from errors of this description, which after all are powerless to affect its general historical character. The only wonder is, not that they exist, but that their numbers are so few.

*Another very striking instance is the apparent disagreement between the Synoptics and St. John as to the day on which Our Lord celebrated the Last Supper, and its Paschal character. Every effort of ingenuity has been exhausted on this controversy, and the mass of literature winch his grown out of the attempts to solve the difficulty is large. Still, if after perusing the most elaborate disquisitions on the subject one reads the simple narrative of the Evangelists, one cannot avoid feeling that the difficulty remains. It seems far more satisfactory, therefore, to have recourse to the principle of Butler, that it has been occasioned by the Synoptics having passed through a period of oral transmission before they were committed to writing. A similar principle is the best solution of an apparent discrepancy between the Synoptics themselves as to the precise day on which the different events in Passion Week occurred, and of those other apparent discrepancies on the reconciliation of which so much ingenuity has been expended. They have only a real importance when the truth of Christianity is complicated with that of a particular theory of inspiration.

A large majority of the other difficulties which arise in connection with the present aspects of modern thought, as far as they are not Atheistic or Pantheistic, may be solved on the same principles. The following proposition, which goes to the root of the entire difficulty, seems so self-evident as to require simply to be stated to insure its acceptance as true. Principles of investigation which, when applied in past ages to the study of the constitution of the universe, have not only been barren of good result, but have led to positive errors, cannot be safe guides to truth when applied to the study of Revelation. Let these then be abandoned; and let those which have unfolded to us what is the real constitution of the universe be substituted in their place. This will lead to an enlarged view of the realities of Revelation, and enable both revelations of God – the one made in the created universe, and the other in the person of Jesus Christ our Lord – to be studied in harmony.

I conclude with the words of the great Bishop, which cannot be too deeply impressed on the mind of every student: – “And as it must be owned that the whole scheme of Scripture is not yet understood, so if it ever comes to be understood before the restitution of all things, and without miraculous interpositions, it must be in the same way as natural knowledge is come at – by the continuance and progress of learning and liberty, and by particular persons attending to, comparing, and pursuing intimations scattered up and down in it, that are overlooked and disregarded by the generality of the world.” What is the inference? Both must be studied, not under the guidance of abstract and unverifiable theories, but by the light of patent and incontrovertible facts. If this course be pursued, the three great revelations of God – in the material universe, in the moral nature of man, and in the person of Jesus Christ our Lord – will constitute one harmonious whole, each throwing light on the other during the ages of the future, until in the dispensation of the fullness of time all things are gathered together in Christ in one, whether they be things on earth or things in heaven.

Supplementary Note.

The foregoing Lectures were composed, and the larger portion of them in type, before the publication of Professor Mozley’s Lectures entitled “Ruling Ideas in Early Ages.” It was impossible therefore for me to notice the positions taken in them on the subject of miracles, which apparently present some points of divergency from those adopted by him in his Bampton course. I will state the points laid down in his Lecture on the Sacrifice of Isaac, as to the evidential value of miracles, and then offer some observations on their bearing on the views propounded in the present volume. The very interesting discussions on the alleged imperfection of the moral teaching of the Old Testament, and Professor Mozley’s mode of meeting the difficulty form no legitimate portion of the present argument. I shall therefore confine my observations to the subject of miracles.

The propositions laid down in the Lecture on the Sacrifice of Isaac are as follows:

1. That the general rule laid down in Scripture is, that miracles are evidences of the divine will; and that a command which has the warrant of a miracle may be regarded as coming from God.

2. While this is the general principle, a collateral principle is recognized in Scripture, that miracles may be permitted by God for the purpose of trial.

3. When a miracle contradicts any clear knowledge we have of the divine will, in such cases it does not bear its primary and most natural interpretation as an evidence of the divine will; but the secondary interpretation as a trial of moral strength in resisting that apparent evidence of the moment, and from without, in favour of the more real evidence of His will which we have from antecedent sources and from within.

4. A miracle cannot authorise the acceptance of any doctrine manifestly opposed to the Gospel revelation.

5. The rule of Scripture in substance is, that no great moral or religious principle or law of conduct, of which we are practically certain on general antecedent grounds, can be upset even by a real miracle; but that when the two come into collision, as evidence, the miracle must give way, and the moral conviction stand; that no miracle in short can outweigh a plain duty; and that a real miracle might be wrought, and yet it would be wrong to do the act which the miracle enjoined.

6. A miracle may be evidence of a divine command to do a particular act to a man whose moral conceptions are low, and yet be no evidence to one in whom they are of a more elevated character. Consequently, miracles may have been evidence of divine commands to former ages, which would wholly fail to prove such commands at the present day. From this it follows that a miracle may in some former age of the world have formed an adequate attestation of a supposed divine command to kill a son; but if it were wrought at the present day in attestation of a similar command, it would be our duty to reject it.

If these are accurate accounts of the Scripture doctrine of the evidential character of miracles, it seems to me that the only effect of their performance would be to throw a plain man into a state of hopeless uncertainty as to what they really substantiated, or what line of duty they prescribed to him. In this note I shall draw attention to a few only of the difficulties involved in the views thus enunciated.

As Dr. Mozley considers that miracles may be performed not only as evidences of a divine command, but for the purposes of trial, it becomes a matter of the highest importance to ascertain whether miracles wrought for this latter purpose are performed by the finger of God, or by the power of Satan. He admits that real miracles may be performed which we are bound to disobey by rejecting the doctrine or the command which they have been performed for the purpose of substantiating. But if any such are alleged to be performed by God, it brings us face to face with a question of the greatest difficulty, viz., whether it is consistent with His character to perform miracles of this description. If on the other hand they are alleged to be Satanic, this opens the all-important question, how are such miracles to be distinguished from the miracles of God, for nothing can be more certain than, if there is no clear mode of discriminating between them, that the evidential value of miracles would be utterly destroyed. Yet no hint is given us how these important questions are to be determined.

But further: if miracles are performed for the purposes of trial, they cannot be the sole and adequate attestations of a revelation. In such a case a person who witnesses a miracle may justly entertain a doubt whether it was wrought to prove a doctrine, or to justify a command; or to test his religious or moral principles, as to whether, despite of the miracle, he would follow the dictates of his own conscience. It is impossible that miracles can subserve the two opposite purposes of being evidences of a divine command, and tests of faith, unless those wrought for the latter purpose bear some mark which clearly distinguishes them from the former.

Let us now consider Dr. Motley’s third position. Assuming its truth, it follows that the evidence afforded by a miracle cannot overbear the clear dictates of our conscience, but whenever it runs counter to them, we are bound to reject the miracle as being a trial of moral strength; or, in other words, a temptation. But the consciences of many earnest men are frequently misinformed. Thus St. Paul tells us that he was acting strictly in conformity with his conscientious convictions, when he persecuted the Christians to the death. If Dr. Mozley’s position therefore is correct, he was justified in rejecting the miracles wrought by the apostles in attestation of Our Lord’s resurrection, as permitted for the purpose of testing the firmness of his adhesion to the Mosaic dispensation.

So with respect to the fourth proposition, that a miracle cannot authorise the acceptance of any doctrine manifestly opposed to the Christian Revelation. This must have been equally true of the Jewish Revelation. But who is to be the judge when doctrines manifestly contradict either of them? There can be no other court of appeal but the conscience of the individual. Now as the obligation to obey the Jewish ceremonial law rested, according to the general principles laid down by Dr. Mozley in his Bampton Lectures, on the evidence of miracles, it follows that a Jew would have been justified in coming to the conclusion that the miracles wrought in attestation of a system, such as Christianity, which was intended to supersede it, were merely trials of his moral strength, and therefore that it was his duty to reject them. This being so, it follows that the Judaizing Christians of the Apostolic Churches were not without substantial reasons for rejecting the validity of St. Paul’s Apostolical Commission, notwithstanding his plea that he possessed a miraculous attestation, for they could plead against them, not only the fact that Our Lord was circumcised, but that he himself was an observer of the Jewish rites, and never directed their abolition during the whole course of his ministry. Consequently, as the Pauline doctrine of the abolition of circumcision was, to use the words of Dr. Mozley, “a manifest contradiction” of the fundamental teaching of the Old Testament, and received no support from the direct teaching of Our Lord, the Judaizing Sections of the Church were fully justified in denouncing St. Paul as a false apostle, notwithstanding the miracles which it was admitted that he performed. They were in fact on this theory only trials of faith, and as such, worthy of rejection.

But further: Dr. Mozley affirms in his first Bampton Lecture, that the only thing which would justify any rational man in accepting the truth of many of Our Lord’s declarations respecting himself, is the evidence of miracles. But according to the principles laid down in the Lecture we are now considering, would not those who witnessed Our Lord’s miracles have been justified in rejecting them as affording evidence of such “incredible assertions” on the ground that they were intended for the purposes of trial in resisting that “apparent evidence of the moment, and from without, in favour of the more real evidence from antecedent sources, and from within?”

I fully agree with Dr. Mozley, that no miracle can justify us in the breach of a plain duty, for the simple reason that there is no ground for supposing that God would ever allow one to be performed for such a purpose. If an apparent miracle is performed which commands us to commit an act which we believe to be immoral, the legitimate conclusion is, that it is an act of legerdemain, a fraud, or the result of some mental hallucination on our part. The supposition that real miracles are wrought for the purposes supposed by Dr. Mozley, would involve simple-minded men in such a mass of difficulties as would deprive them of all evidential value. The miracles recorded in the Gospels were not performed for the benefit of the select few who constitute a kind of spiritual aristocracy, but of the masses of mankind.

With respect to the general proposition that miracles may be a justification of particular acts, to an age when the moral standard is low, while they would fail to afford any such justification to a more elevated one, it must be remembered, that even in ages of deep moral degradation, all are not sunk to the same dead level. To such, miracles would not be evidences of a divine command, but trials of moral strength. To take an illustration from modern times. War does not violate the general conscience of the Christian Church at the present day. A miracle therefore, according to the principles laid down by Dr. Mozley, might justify a particular war as an actual divine command to wage it. But a section of the Christian Church, the Quakers, believe war to be contrary to the principles of the Gospel. To such therefore a miracle wrought for the purpose of sanctioning it, would be simply a trial of moral strength. It follows therefore, that if the evidential character of miracles is correctly set forth in the positions I am considering, it is of a nature so vague and indefinite, as to be valueless for the purposes of proof.

There is one sound principle, and only one, which affords an adequate explanation of the imperfections of portions of the morality of the Old Testament. It is to be found in an utterance of our Blessed Lord himself: “ Moses, for the hardness of your hearts, wrote you this precept.”

As far as the Sacrifice of Isaac is concerned, the question whether miracles will justify such commands is simply irrelevant, for the narrative in Genesis does not contain a hint that a miracle was wrought for its justification. All that it tells us is, that an intimation was conveyed to the patriarch (of the precise mode in which the communication was made we are not informed), to offer his son as a burnt sacrifice, and that Abraham recognized in it a divine command. But not one word is said about the performance of a miracle in attestation of its reality. This idea can be only introduced into it by assuming that the command itself constituted a miracle. I fully admit that when God commands us to perform a particular act, He call give us the fullest assurance that the command is from Him. But to class together supernatural communications made to individuals, and Our Lord’s miracles under a common term, is to invite confusion of thought. In no ordinary sense of the term can it be said that Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac was authorised by the evidence of a miracle wrought as an attestation that the command came from God. I can only again express my conviction that if the positions laid down by Dr. Mozley in these Lectures are accurate accounts of the functions which miracles perform in connection with Christianity, they are simply destructive of their evidential character.

Chapters 5 & 6 Home